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Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—
Stigma or Affirmative Action? 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig† 
Emily Houh†† 
Mary Campbell†††
This Article examines the strength of arguments concerning the causal 
connection between racial stigma and affirmative action. In so doing, this 
Article reports and analyzes the results of a survey on internal stigma (feelings 
of dependency, inadequacy, or guilt) and external stigma (the burden of others’ 
resentment or doubt about one’s qualifications) for the Class of 2009 at seven 
public law schools, four of which employed race-based affirmative action 
policies when the Class of 2009 was admitted and three of which did not use 
such policies at that time. Specifically, this Article examines and presents 
survey findings of 1) minimal, if any, internal stigma felt by minority law 
students, regardless of whether their schools practiced race-based affirmative 
action; 2) no statistically significant difference in internal stigma between 
minority students at affirmative action law schools and non-affirmative action 
law schools; and 3) no significant impact from external stigma. 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly thirty years, the American public has debated the merits of 
race-based affirmative action in higher education.1 From Allan Bakke’s 
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1. Compare Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Response, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the 
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challenge to the admissions program at the University of California, Davis 
School of Medicine,2 to the current legislative challenges in states such as 
Arizona3 and Colorado,4 opponents of race-based affirmative action have 
Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (2005) (arguing that affirmative action does 
not create, but rather mitigates, racial disparities in the law school context), Dorothy A. Brown, 
The LSAT Sweepstakes, 2 J. Gender Race & Just. 59 (1998) (critiquing the racially biased 
nature of the LSAT and its value as a predictor of law school performance), David L. Chambers et 
al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical 
Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1855, 1898 (2005) (arguing that “without 
affirmative action, both the enrollment of African American law students . . . and the production 
of African American lawyers would significantly decline”), Sumi K. Cho, Multiple Consciousness 
and the Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1035, 1061 (1997) (describing, in the affirmative 
action context, dominant conceptions of merit as embracing a “white baseline of experience” and 
dominant conceptions of societal discrimination as embracing a “Black baseline of experience” 
and advocating an “alternative racial formation analysis that would conceptually link the 
experiences of various groups of color through the critique of white supremacy”), Richard 
Delgado, Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action—How Valid?, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 135, 139 
(1998) (arguing, in part, that stigma “predates and operates independently of affirmative action”), 
and Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me A River: The Limits of “A Systematic 
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 1 (2005) 
(arguing that existing structural and systemic forms of race and gender inequality within 
institutions of higher learning, rather than affirmative action, are the most likely causes of racial 
disparities in law school grades and bar passage), with Kingsley R. Browne, Affirmative Action: 
Policy-Making by Deception, 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1291 (1996) (critiquing implementation of 
affirmative action programs in various contexts as confused and inconsistent, and defending 
notions of objective standards and merit), Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 33 (1992) (arguing that affirmative action policies both penalize innocent 
white people who have not themselves perpetrated discrimination and stigmatize their purported 
beneficiaries, and advocating a return to “race neutral” principles), Lino Graglia, Gratz and 
Grutter: Race Preferences To Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently Unconstitutional” 
Unless Done Subtly in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity”, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 2037 (2004) (arguing 
that affirmative action admissions policies such as those at issue in the Gratz and Grutter cases are 
designed only to increase black enrollment, not to increase diversity), Gail Heriot, Thoughts on 
Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as Law and as Practical Politics, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
137, 138 (2004) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz and Grutter as “tragically 
misguided” and politically impractical, and arguing that race neutral alternatives should have been 
more closely considered and mandated by the Court), Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of 
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 367 (2004) (arguing that 
affirmative action admissions policies at American law schools create an academic mismatch 
effect that significantly reduces the number of black lawyers), and Antonin Scalia, The Disease As 
Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 Wash. U. L. 
Q. 147 (critiquing the then-existing Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence as incoherent 
and misguided). 
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. The Arizona Civil Rights Initiative currently is campaigning for a November 2008 ballot 
initiative. Its operative language states: “The state shall not discriminate against or grant 
preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting.” 
Arizona Civil Rights Initiative, Adversity.Net News, http://www.adversity.net/ 
supertuesday2008/arizona.htm. 
4. The Colorado Civil Rights Initiative is also moving forward with plans for an anti-
affirmative action ballot measure for November 2008. The language of the Colorado initiative 
mirrors that of Arizona’s, see supra note 3. See Colorado Civil Rights Initiative Coming to 2008 
Ballot, Apr. 23, 2007, http://coloradocri.org/ (last visited July 28, 2008). Similar initiatives passed 
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attacked the policy as discriminatory and constitutionally invalid. 
The initial challenges to affirmative action focused primarily on 
arguments concerning the policy’s ineffectiveness as a solution to racial 
inequality and the innocence of Whites5 who found themselves “negatively” 
affected by affirmative action programs.6 As time progressed, however, rather 
than focusing primarily on affirmative action’s purported unfairness to Whites, 
many affirmative action opponents increasingly began to articulate what they 
saw as the policy’s unfairness to one group of beneficiaries: underrepresented 
racial minorities.7 According to this group of activists, the most damaging 
consequence of “unfair” affirmative action policies was the stigma that racial 
minorities experienced because of the programs. Proponents of this view 
identified both internal stigma—doubt of one’s own qualifications—and 
external stigma—the burden of the doubts of others in one’s qualifications—as 
reasons for dismantling affirmative action programs.8
For example, in 1992, Terry Eastland, a former fellow at the Ethics and 
previously in the states of California, Washington, and Michigan. See id. 
5. Throughout this Article, we capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when we use 
them as nouns to describe a racialized group; however, we do not capitalize these terms when we 
use them as adjectives. Also, we prefer to use the term “Blacks” to the term “African Americans” 
because the term “Blacks” is more inclusive. See Why “Black” and Not “African-American,” 3 J. 
Higher Educ. 18, 18-19 (1994) (describing why the term “black” is a more inclusive term than 
“African-American”). Additionally, we find that “[i]t is more convenient to invoke the 
terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and 
Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between 
the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: 
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1043, 1073 (1992). 
6. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the “Culturally Deprived” to Law 
School, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 351, 352 (1970) (“Discrimination in favor of some racial or ethnic 
groups necessarily is or appears to be discrimination against others. . . . Further, discrimination in 
favor of particular racial or ethnic groups is largely or entirely unnecessary to achieve true 
equality in educational opportunity and is unjust to those who have been denied such opportunity 
on other grounds.”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 153-54 (“I am not willing to prefer the son of a 
prosperous and well-educated black doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—to the son of a 
recent refugee of Eastern Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get his family ahead.”). 
But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective 
Admissions, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 (2002) (“In any admissions process where applicants 
greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, 
substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of 
admission facing white applicants.”); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 Vand. 
L. Rev. 297 (1990) (unpacking the loaded concept of “innocence” in the affirmative action 
debate). 
7. White women are rarely included as a topic in these debates about affirmative action, 
even though white women are the largest beneficiaries of affirmative action. See Gloria J. Ladson-
Billings, Can We At Least Have Plessy? The Struggle for Quality Education, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 
1279, 1282 (2007). But see Sacha E. de Lange, Toward Gender Equality: Affirmative Action, 
Comparable Worth, and the Women’s Movement, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 315, 320-
38 (2007) (challenging, from a feminist perspective, the well-accepted assumption that white 
women are the biggest benefactors of affirmative action). 
8. See infra notes 10 & 17 and accompanying text (providing definitions for internal and 
external stigma). 
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Public Policy Center and a former publisher of the American Spectator, 
proclaimed that stigma was “[p]erhaps the most damning judgment against 
affirmative action . . . [given that it] comes in the form of objections that could 
only be expressed by blacks and members of other minority groups typically 
included in affirmative action programs.”9 Eastland focused primarily on the 
harms of internal stigma, which are “the feeling[s] of dependency, inadequacy, 
and at times guilt that can strike those who believe themselves to be 
beneficiaries of affirmative action.”10 Eastland gave as an example a statement 
from a Latino officer at Bank of America: “‘Sometimes I wonder: Did I get this 
job because of my abilities, or because they needed to fill a quota?’”11
Since the late 1980s, arguments concerning the internal effects of stigma 
have gained significant power and persuasive force, in part due to the voice 
given to them by conservative members of racial minority groups.12 In fact, as 
proof of internal stigma, white opponents of affirmative action often cite anti-
affirmative action statements from minority conservatives, such as Shelby 
Steele,13 who once asserted that “when a black student enters college, the myth 
of inferiority compounds the normal anxiousness over whether he or she will be 
good enough.”14
Additionally, scholars and pundits have repeatedly noted the force of the 
stigma arguments presented by Justice Clarence Thomas, the second black man 
to serve on the United States Supreme Court.15 Indeed, Justice Thomas, who is 
9. Eastland, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
10. Ashley M. Hibbett, The Enigma of the Stigma: A Case Study on the Validity of the 
Stigma Arguments Made in Opposition to Affirmative Action Programs in Higher Education, 21 
Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 75, 77 (2005). 
11. Eastland, supra note 1, at 42 (quoting Sonia L. Nazario, Many Minorities Feel Torn by 
Experience of Affirmative Action, Wall St. J., June 27, 1989, at A1). 
12. See Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities: Building Coalitions Through 
Redistribution of Academic Capital—An Exercise in Praxis, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1201, 1229 
(2005) (discussing how conservatives minorities can use their “voice of color” to perpetuate 
subordination); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of 
Context, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 164 (1990) (arguing that the “voice of the new conservatives of 
color is so powerful, so damning to some, precisely because it emanates from people of color”); 
Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1987) (suggesting “that those who have experienced discrimination speak 
with a special voice to which we should listen”). 
13. Eastland cited to Steele in making his own arguments concerning the strength of the 
stigma argument against race-based affirmative action. Eastland, supra note 1, at 41-42. Likewise, 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s external stigma arguments from Grutter, see infra note 15, were 
heavily cited by newspapers, scholars, and pundits, with many conceding the force of such 
arguments in their analyses. 
14. Shelby Steele, The Content of Our Character 134 (1st ed. 1990). 
15. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Thomas?: The 
Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 787, 806 (2005) (declaring that Justice 
“Thomas’s approach [in Grutter] open[ed] the door to an argument that these stigmatizing criteria 
should be understood as a form of discrimination that is cognizable and remediable at law”); Mary 
Kate Kearney, Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion Play a Role in a Jurist’s 
Reasoning?, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 15, 35 (2004) (asserting that Justice Thomas “infused his 
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likely the most well-known opponent of affirmative action, notably denounces 
the policy on the grounds of internal stigma in his concurrence in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: 
[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended 
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of 
discrimination. . . . Inevitably, [affirmative action] programs engender 
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among 
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s 
use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of 
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an 
attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences.16
In addition to internal stigma, opponents of affirmative action also contest 
the policy on the grounds of external stigma, which is “the burden of being 
treated or viewed differently by others, or as though one is unqualified, based 
on the assumption that one is a beneficiary of affirmative action.”17 For 
example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Thomas raises the argument of 
external stigma in a manner that many considered to be personal,18 stating: 
It is uncontested that each year, the [University of Michigan] Law 
School admits a handful of blacks who would be admitted in the 
absence of racial discrimination. Who can differentiate between those 
reasoning [in Grutter] with a power that is difficult to ignore”); Joshua M. Levine, Comment, 
Stigma’s Opening: Grutter’s Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 457, 480 (2005) (“The Thomas opinion presents a bracing 
case against affirmative action, but more importantly, his opinion sets forth a legal argument about 
a potential cost to racial minorities from affirmative action: stigmatic harm.”); see also Gruber, 
supra note 12, at 1229 (noting that Justice Thomas’s “manipulation of language seeks to show the 
reader his special insights on affirmative action because of his color”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the 
Influence of Racial Identity, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 931, 987-96 (2005) (describing how Justice 
Thomas’s stance on affirmative action is rooted in black conservative thought, which is distinct 
from white conservative thought). 
16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
17. Hibbett, supra note 10, at 77. 
18. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 15, at 25 (describing Justice Thomas’s stigma argument 
as “a more personal critique of the majority’s analysis”); Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Could Thomas 
Be Right?, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2003, at A25 (“[Justice Thomas] knew that he could not make a 
powerful legal argument against racial preferences, given the fact that he got into Yale Law 
School and got picked for the Supreme Court thanks to his race. So he made a powerful 
psychological argument . . . . [His dissent in Grutter] is a clinical study of a man who has been 
driven barking mad by the beneficial treatment he has received. It’s poignant, really. It makes him 
crazy that people think that he is where he is because of his race, but he is where he is because of 
his race.”); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Divided Rulings in the University of Michigan 
Affirmative Action Cases: What Does it All Mean?, FindLaw’s Writ, June 25, 2003, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030625.html (“[T]he real heart of Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
Grutter is more personal. He harbors an almost visceral hatred for what he terms ‘know-it-all 
elites.’ . . . . How did this graduate of Yale Law School come to despise the sort of institution that 
opened so many doors for him? The answer, it seems, is that he believes affirmative action 
stigmatizes not only its beneficiaries, but all people of color . . .”). 
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who belong and those who do not? The majority of blacks are admitted 
to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this 
policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not 
depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the 
“beneficiaries” of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in 
the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open 
question today whether their skin color played a part in their 
advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial 
discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be 
deemed “otherwise qualified,” or it did not, in which case asking the 
question itself unfairly marks those blacks who succeed without 
discrimination.19
Justice Thomas’s arguments in Grutter echo past statements by black 
conservatives, such as Steele, who similarly argued that “[m]uch of the ‘subtle’ 
discrimination that blacks talk about is often (not always) discrimination 
against the stigma of questionable competence that affirmative action delivers 
to blacks.”20 Recently, Professor Richard Sander of UCLA School of Law has 
utilized the external stigma rationale to explain the high attrition rate of black 
and Latino attorneys at law firms and to argue against the use of affirmative 
action in that context.21
Given the effectiveness of the stigma argument as a rhetorical and 
substantive weapon against affirmative action, we decided to explore the 
relationship between stigma and law school affirmative action admissions 
policies. To do so, we collected, for the first time ever, survey responses from 
both white students and students of color in the Class of 2009 at seven 
high-ranked public law schools. The seven law schools we included in our 
survey are: (1) the University of California, Berkeley (“UC Berkeley”); (2) the 
University of California, Davis (“UC Davis”); (3) the University of Cincinnati; 
(4) the University of Iowa; (5) the University of Michigan; (6) the University of 
Virginia; and (7) the University of Washington. Four of these schools—the 
University of Cincinnati, the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan,22 
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
20. Steele, Content of Our Character, supra note 14, at 120. 
21. Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1755, 
1812 (2006) (arguing that external stigma contributes to the high attrition rate of black associates 
at law firms in that partners “tend to [give] less responsibility and fewer ‘proving’ assignments” to 
black associates because they have low expectations of black associates). Shelby Steele made a 
similar comment concerning the external effect of affirmative action on black success in the 
workplace when he contended that the glass ceiling for Blacks may be the result of Blacks’ 
reputation for advancing, not through their own merits, but because of their race. See Shelby 
Steele, A Negative Vote on Affirmative Action, in Debating Affirmative Action: Race, 
Gender, Ethnicity, and the Politics of Inclusion 37, 41 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994). 
22. Since 2006, the University of Michigan Law School has not employed a race-based 
affirmative action program. In 2006, residents of the state of Michigan voted in favor of an 
initiative that banned the use of race-based affirmative action in public universities. See Michigan 
Votes Down Affirmative Action, InsideHigherEd.com, Nov. 8, 2006, 
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and the University of Virginia—employed race-based affirmative action when 
they admitted the Class of 2009 law students, while the remaining three—UC 
Berkeley, UC Davis, and the University of Washington—did not use such 
programs. 
By gathering and analyzing data from students at these seven law schools, 
we were able to compare the responses of students at institutions that use 
affirmative action in their admission process with those of students at 
institutions that do not use affirmative action in their admission process. 
Specifically, we situated and analyzed the collected results within the context 
of legal scholarship on stigma and affirmative action so that we could 
empirically examine arguments about internal and external stigma as applied to 
this small selection of educational institutions. In so doing, we generated new 
descriptive evidence that counters the stigma arguments that are commonly 
advanced against affirmative action. 
In conducting our survey, we focused primarily on the question of internal 
stigma. Our goals, as they related to internal stigma, were twofold. First, we 
wanted to examine the truth, if any, behind the controversial assumption 
regarding the causal connection between stigma and affirmative action—the 
argument that affirmative action results in internal feelings of inferiority by its 
beneficiaries.23 Although previous studies had found that minority students at 
elite institutions of higher education graduated at very high rates and went on to 
have careers equally distinguished as those of their white peers,24 none of these 
studies specifically addressed the potential effect of affirmative action on the 
internal thoughts and feelings of minority law students while in school. 
Consequently, in our study, we placed special emphasis on exploring the 
following question: To the extent that students of color do feel stigmatized, is it 
affirmative action that causes such stigma, or does the stigma result from a 
complex set of environmental, societal, and cultural factors? We wanted to 
explore whether potential beneficiaries of affirmative action would agree with 
activist Eva Patterson, who once facetiously proclaimed, “‘Stigmatize [us], give 
[us] that degree.’ [It’s not] [a]s though if you don’t have [an elite] degree 
you’re not stigmatized as a black person.”25
http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/08/michigan. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term 
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (1998); 
Richard O. Lempert, David L. Chambers, & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in 
Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 395 (2000); see also 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (O’Connor, J.) (highlighting that a significant percentage of the country’s 
leaders come from “highly selective . . . schools”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Riposte: The 
Mismatch Theory of Law School Admissions, 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 637, 651 (2007) (arguing that 
Blacks at top law schools are more likely to succeed in those schools than in lower-tiered schools 
because, at the top law schools, the professors assume that all of their students will have 
distinguished careers). 
25. Eva Jefferson Patterson, Affirmative Action and the California Civil Wrongs Initiative, 
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Second, we analyzed the issue of external stigma. However, we 
considered the examination of external stigma to be of less importance than 
internal stigma because we wanted to focus on what Eastland referred to as “the 
most damning judgment against affirmative action.”26 Nevertheless, we did 
examine questions concerning external stigma and affirmative action as a 
means of analyzing opponents’ claims that external stigma will disappear when 
affirmative action is no longer in place. Additionally, we examined the question 
of external stigma in order to understand the environments in which minority 
law students may be battling the effects of stereotype threat.27
Overall, we wanted to question the validity of the stigma argument 
because, as Professor Cornel West would say, the stigma argument matters. It 
matters especially today, as state-by-state political campaigns against race-
based affirmative action programs continue to gain ground. Indeed, affirmative 
action opponents like Ward Connerly and his anti-affirmative action 
juggernauts, including the American Civil Rights Institute (“ACRI”) and the 
American Civil Rights Coalition (“ACRC”), have used the stigma argument to 
great effect, spearheading successful efforts to dismantle affirmative action 
programs in California and Michigan and currently working to accomplish the 
same ends in states such as Arizona and Colorado.28 In fact, the stigma 
argument is a crucial piece of opponents’ attacks on affirmative action 
27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 327, 334 (1997); see also Christopher A. Bracey, Getting Back to 
Basics: Some Thoughts on Dignity, Materialism, and a Culture of Racial Equality, 26 Chicano-
Latino L. Rev. 15, 38 (2006) (“It is hard to imagine how providing the material preconditions to 
exercise freedom on an equal basis would prove stigmatizing.”). 
26. Eastland, supra note 1, at 41. 
27. See infra Part I.B.2; see also Claude Steele, Stereotype Threat and African-American 
Student Achievement, in Theresa Perry, Claude Steele, & Asa G. Hilliard III, Young, 
Gifted, and Black: Promoting High Achievement Among African-American Students 
109 (2003) [hereinafter Steele, Stereotype Threat]; Claude Steele, Expert Report, Reports 
Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 439, 440, 444-46 (1999) 
[hereinafter Steele, Expert]. In his research on stereotype threat, Professor Steele discovered that 
black students comparable in ability to their white counterparts performed worse on examinations 
when they were told that their ability was being tested. When Professor Steele tested a different 
group of comparable black and white students but told them that the test was a problem-solving 
task rather than a test of ability, the performance of the black students matched that of their white 
counterparts. By changing the function of the test, Professor Steele “changed the meaning of the 
situation. It told Black participants that the racial stereotype about their ability was irrelevant to 
their performance on this particular task.” Id. at 445. 
28. For information on these organizations, see the official website of the American Civil 
Rights Institute at http://www.acri.org/, and the official website of the related American Civil 
Rights Coalition at http://www.acrc1.org/. See Natalie Moore, At it Again: Affirmative Action For 
Ward Connerly Returns, The Crisis, Winter 2008, at 9; Peter Schmidt, 4 States Named in 
Affirmative-Action Fight, Chron. of Educ., May 4, 2007, at 34; Peter Schmidt, 5 More States 
May Curtail Affirmative Action, Chron. of Educ., Oct. 19, 2007, at 1; Melody Drnach, 
Opponents of Equal Opportunity Determined to Protect Their Interests, Nat’l NOW Times, Jan. 
1, 2008, at 10; Jan Erickson, Conservatives Push to End Affirmative Action, Nat’l NOW Times, 
Jan. 1, 2007, at 2; Louis Freedberg, The Man Behind Prop. 29, Wash. Monthly, Mar. 1998, at 
20. 
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precisely because it aims to convince people “on the fence” that a vote against 
affirmative action is a vote to protect minorities from the harms of a well-
intentioned but misguided program.29 Although our survey represents only a 
first step in responding to this stigma argument, its results, which contradict 
arguments about the causal connection between stigma and affirmative action 
(at least as it may exist within the seven surveyed law schools), suggest that 
further examination with a more representative sample of law students from 
schools across the country could be informative and important for 
understanding the real impact of affirmative action programs. 
In this Article, we give a preliminary answer to the question of which 
came first—stigma or affirmative action—by presenting and discussing our 
empirical data collected from the Class of 2009 at the seven surveyed law 
schools. In Part I of this Article, we give context to our empirical research by 
examining academic arguments about stigma and affirmative action, with a 
focus on legal, critical race, and sociolegal critiques. 
In Part II, we describe our concerns about administering the survey and 
identify important limitations of our research methodology. In so doing, we 
explain how we gathered and analyzed our data and how we selected schools 
and responded to the concerns of subject and non-subject schools. 
In Part III, we present the limits and results of our survey, and our analysis 
thereof, in three subsections. In the first subsection, we detail the descriptive 
limits and results of our survey. With respect to the descriptive results, we 
report four important findings. 
First, we present our finding that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the responses about internal stigma between minority students at 
the four affirmative action law schools in our survey and those at the three non-
affirmative action law schools in our survey. We also reveal that, overall, there 
is minimal internal stigma felt by responding students of color as a result of the 
policy. 
Second, we share our finding that respondents of color felt no significant 
impact from external stigma. As our data reveal, minority law students in the 
sampled affirmative action schools are no more likely to feel that they are 
treated differently by classmates and professors because of being perceived as 
affirmative action beneficiaries than those in the sampled non-affirmative 
action schools. 
Third, we report data that support our contention that external stigma does 
29. See Hibbett, supra note 10, at 78 (asserting that “many affirmative action opponents, in 
the interest of making their position appear benevolent, have a tendency to exaggerate the 
prevalence of internal stigma to suggest that the primary objection to affirmative action is that it 
harms its beneficiaries more than anyone else.”); cf. Johnson, supra note 12, at 140 (noting how 
minorities are “able to espouse [conservative] views that, because [they are of color], are not 
viewed as racist,” but that “[i]f similar arguments were made by a majority (white) scholar, 
charges of racism would be rife”). 
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not disappear when affirmative action is eliminated. Specifically, we reveal 
data that show that a relatively high number of students at the sampled non-
affirmative action law schools responded that they believed that some law 
students of color were admitted to school because of affirmative action. 
Fourth, we describe our findings of strong support across the entire 
sample for the belief that people should learn to interact with others from 
diverse backgrounds and the idea that diversity enhances education, though 
support for this second idea is stronger in non-affirmative action law schools 
than in affirmative action law schools. Additionally, we report our findings that 
students at surveyed affirmative action law schools are slightly more likely to 
agree that affirmative action gives preferences to less qualified applicants and 
constitutes reverse discrimination and that students at surveyed non-affirmative 
action law schools are slightly more likely to agree that law schools should 
make special efforts to overcome past discrimination. 
In the second subsection of Part III, we explain the statistical models of 
these attitudes and the implications of our results. In so doing, we provide 
further background for how readers may interpret our descriptive results. For 
example, we explicate how statistical controls for factors such as race and 
gender explained away the reported differences across school type with respect 
to attitudes toward affirmative action, as reported in the first subsection. Our 
examination of the attitudes of all respondents showed that, once characteristics 
of the respondents such as race and gender were statistically controlled, 
students at the surveyed affirmative action law schools were no more likely to 
oppose affirmative action than students at surveyed non-affirmative action law 
schools. 
In the third subsection, we briefly discuss one particular type of comment 
from a number of students at the end of the survey. Specifically, we analyze 
comments that called for a revision of affirmative action policies with a focus 
on socioeconomic class. 
Finally, we conclude this Article with a discussion of stigma and an 
analysis of why neither internal stigma nor external stigma mandates the 
abolition of affirmative action. In sum, we explain why a true understanding of 
stigma does not support the dismantling of affirmative action on campuses, but 
rather requires its preservation and fortification. 
I 
THE SCHOLARLY LANDSCAPE 
This Part provides a broad overview of the existing literature on stigma 
and other related harms purportedly caused by affirmative action. Part I.A 
describes the work of the preeminent sociologist Erving Goffman, whose early 
work in the 1960s opened the door to the study of stigma as a sociological 
phenomenon. Part I.B discusses William Bowen and Derek Bok’s recent 
comprehensive study on affirmative action, which presents quantitative and 
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qualitative evidence to disprove arguments relating to the harms, including 
stigmatic harms, that affirmative action purportedly inflicts upon its 
beneficiaries. Part I.C reviews some of the more compelling legal scholarship 
on stigma from recent years and discusses how this work informs this Article’s 
analysis and goals. 
A. Erving Goffman’s Theory of Stigma: Stigma Defined 
In a now famous commencement address to Howard University’s 
graduating class of 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson explained the necessity 
for what later became known as “affirmative action”: 
[F]reedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries 
by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you 
desire, and choose the leaders you please. You do not take a person 
who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him 
up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are free to compete 
with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been 
completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of 
opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through 
those gates. This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle 
for civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not 
just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a 
theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.30
Soon after giving this speech, President Johnson issued Executive Order 
11246, in which he coined the term “affirmative action” by requiring 
government contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are 
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard 
to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”31
Two years prior to President Johnson’s introduction of affirmative action 
in government programs, Erving Goffman published his classic monograph, 
Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity,32 which remains a 
fundamental sociological text.33 Of course, the very concept of racial stigma 
has become central to the growing affirmative action debates, due to 
opponents’ purportedly benign argument that such programs would only harm 
30. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To 
Fulfill These Rights,” 2 Pub. Papers 635, 636 (June 4, 1965). 
31. Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
2000e (2000). 
32. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 
(1963). 
33. Goffman’s work on stigma has been far-reaching in the social sciences. Notably, 
however, its impact has been far more limited on the legal theorizing of stigma. See R.A. 
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
803, 815-16 n.46 (2004) (discussing, for example, how courts and constitutional scholars 
theorizing about stigma have not done so uniformly or with particular reference to Goffman’s 
work on stigma). 
ONWUACHI-WILLIG13POSTAUTHOR.DOC 9/3/2008  4:16:51 PM 
112 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  96:nnn 
 
their intended beneficiaries by stigmatizing them.34 A close look at Goffman’s 
theory of stigma, however, demonstrates the fundamentally misleading nature 
of those arguments, as racial stigma pre-existed the implementation of 
affirmative action programs by centuries, and continues to persist, perhaps in 
an even more severe form, in its absence. 
Goffman’s theory of stigma—which he initially defines as “a special kind 
of relationship between attribute and stereotype”35—fundamentally explains an 
ideological policing of social identity, social intercourse, and social norms. In 
more contemporary terms, Goffman’s theory of stigma can be understood as a 
theory of social construction.36 His theory of stigma has meaning only insofar 
as it is used to describe and analyze societal classification of insiders and 
outsiders to varying degrees and to rank them in the social hierarchy 
accordingly. This reality is most clear in the way Goffman distinguishes the 
stigmatized from what he calls “the normals.”37 A stigmatized individual is one 
who “possesses . . . an undesired differentness from what we had 
anticipated.”38 Such marks of difference, whether facially evident (like race or 
disfigurement) or concealable (like sexuality, religion, or criminality), are 
always discrediting and dehumanizing.39
Stigma brings to light the experiences of different kinds of stigmatized 
peoples, including (in Goffman’s terms): racial minorities, the disfigured, the 
disabled, homosexuals, non-Protestants (primarily Jews and Catholics), 
criminals, and the illegitimate. Much of Goffman’s study examines how the 
34. See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text. 
35. See Goffman, supra note 32, at 4. 
36. Michael Omi and Howard Winant were among the first to theorize and name a social 
constructionist approach to race in Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s 
to the 1980s (1986) [hereinafter Omi & Winant, Racial Formation 1986] which has since 
been followed by a second edition—Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in 
the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (2d ed. 1994). Omi and Winant’s theory of 
racial social construction rejects “biologistic notions of race.” Omi & Winant, Racial 
Formation 1986, supra, at 60. They define racial formation as “the process by which social, 
economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by 
which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.” Id. at 61. Further, Omi and Winant’s theory of 
racial formation explicitly rejects conceptions of race that subsume race within other broader 
categories (such as ethnicity and/or class) and that do not treat race as a “central axis of social 
relations.” Id. at 61-62. 
37.  “Normals” are defined as “those who do not depart negatively from the particular 
expectations at issue.” See Goffman supra note 32, at 5. Of “normals,” Goffman further writes: 
The attitudes we normals have toward a person with a stigma, and the actions we take 
in regard to him, are well known, since these responses are what benevolent social 
action is designed to soften and ameliorate. By definition, of course, we believe the 
person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of 
discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life 
chances. We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and 
account for the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on 
other differences, such as those of social class. 
Id. 
38. See id. at 5. 
39. See id. at 4. 
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stigmatized interact with “normals” or in overwhelmingly “normal” settings, 
paying particular attention to the many ways in which the stigmatized may alter 
and shape their outer selves—their “virtual social identit[ies]”40—in order to 
interact. How, for example, do the stigmatized adjust to life among the 
normals? How do they preserve their true senses of selves, their “dignity and 
self-respect,” their “actual social identit[ies]”?41 Given societal pressure and 
the necessity to conform to be accepted, how can the stigmatized achieve levels 
of “normification”42 necessary for survival, while avoiding 
“minstrelization”?43
What is clear in Stigma, though not explicitly stated, is that while stigma 
may have many causes, it exists because of enforced social hierarchy and, to a 
lesser extent, social isolation. Goffman notes that he uses “stigma” to refer to 
“an attribute that is deeply discrediting.”44 However, he points out that “a 
language of relationships, not attributes, is really needed” because these 
attributes are only stigmatized in relation to a specific set of others, and the 
same attribute may enhance social standing in a different context.45 We add 
that, at least in terms of race, such stigma results most directly from our 
nation’s unique history of racial inequality. Although Goffman spends little 
time on the possibility of reducing or eliminating stigma, such isolation and 
inequality—in its many forms and with its many and complicated causes—are 
what affirmative action programs have generally aimed to alleviate and 
eliminate. 
B. Bowen & Bok: Stigma and the Related Harms of Affirmative Action 
In 1998, Professors William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, former presidents 
of Princeton University and Harvard University, respectively, published their 
landmark sociological study The Shape of the River, which quantitatively and 
comprehensively studied the effects of affirmative action in college and 
university admissions.46 Using data on over 80,000 students who had 
matriculated at twenty-eight selective colleges and universities, Bowen and 
Bok tested assumptions about “race-sensitive” admissions that, up until then, 
had not yet been empirically substantiated.47 For example, Bowen and Bok 
40. See id. at 2. 
41. See id. 
42. In more contemporary social constructionist terms, we might refer to “normalization” 
as “assimilation.” See Omi & Winant, Racial Formation 1986, supra note 36, at 15-20 
(discussing the rise of the assimilationist approach to race, which became dominant in the mid and 
late twentieth century). Assimilation—or “Anglo conformity”—was viewed as “the most logical, 
and ‘natural,’ response to the dilemma imposed by racism” and is sharply critiqued by Omi and 
Winant in Racial Formation. See id. at 17-18. 
43. See Goffman, supra note 32, at 110. 
44. See id. at 3. 
45. See id. 
46. Bowen & Bok, supra note 24, at xxvii-xxviii (1998). 
47. Id. at xvii, xxvii-xxx. 
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gathered and analyzed data about affirmative action’s impact on: minority 
graduates’ academic performance, both at undergraduate levels and with 
respect to their subsequent pursuit of graduate and professional degrees; 
employment, earnings, and job satisfaction; and civic participation, leadership, 
and satisfaction in life.48 Bowen and Bok also studied views of minority and 
majority graduate students on their college experiences, attitudes, and 
perceptions of diversity more generally.49 Shape of the River is widely regarded 
as a definitive empirical study on affirmative action and, further, as evidence of 
its success in the incremental struggle toward racial equality.50
1. Challenging Claims of Internal and External Stigma 
Although Bowen and Bok did not test the stigma argument directly, they 
persuasively argue against claims that affirmative action harms its intended 
beneficiaries. Most notably, Bowen and Bok critique Shelby Steele’s argument, 
mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, that affirmative action causes internal 
stigma.51 Bowen and Bok claim that internal stigma’s expected effects—such 
as more self-doubt in black as compared to white college students—are not 
borne out by the data. According to Bowen and Bok’s study, black matriculants 
are not demoralized, but rather are just as appreciative of their undergraduate 
experiences as their white counterparts, and feel even more positively about 
their experiences than their white classmates.52 “[I]f black students admitted to 
the most academically demanding schools suffered as a result,” write Bowen 
and Bok, “they certainly don’t seem to know it.”53
Bowen and Bok also challenge the argument that affirmative action is 
harmful because its beneficiaries are academically unqualified for the schools 
to which they are admitted, and therefore find it hard to keep up. Researchers 
have used this “fit hypothesis” to explain racial disparities in test scores and 
college dropout rates. For example, sociologists Stephan and Abigail 
Thernstrom support the fit hypothesis by pointing out the statistic that the black 
college dropout rate is roughly 50% higher than the white dropout rate.54 
48. See id. at 53-192. 
49. See id. at 193-255. 
50. In the Grutter opinion, for example, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, cited 
and relied on The Shape of the River to explain the educational benefits that flow from student 
body diversity, and held that such diversity was a compelling state interest. Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). Further, as leading scholars in the area, Professors Bowen and Bok 
each submitted expert reports on “The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education,” 
based in large part on their influential study, in both the Grutter and Gratz cases. See University of 
Michigan Admissions Lawsuits, http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/research/#um (last 
visited July 28, 2008). 
51. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
52. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 24, at 261. 
53. Id. at 261. 
54. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White: 
One Nation Indivisible 405-06, 408 (1997) (comparing dropout rates of black and white 
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Because the fit hypothesis suggests that the purported beneficiaries of 
affirmative action are not as qualified as their white counterparts, it feeds 
directly into arguments that affirmative action programs cause both internal and 
external stigma. 
Some researchers have applied the fit hypothesis to the law school 
context. In a controversial 2004 article, Richard Sander argues that affirmative 
action admissions policies at American law schools create an academic 
“mismatch” effect that reduces the number of black lawyers by 7.9%.55 
According to Sander, affirmative action in admissions create this mismatch 
because African American students admitted under affirmative action programs 
to elite law schools are not academically qualified to compete with their non-
black classmates. Thus, Sander argues, affirmative action programs ultimately 
harm African American students and the African American bar.56
Bowen and Bok argue that their findings undermine Thernstrom and 
Thernstrom’s interpretation of black dropout rates. They state: 
If race-sensitive admissions in selective colleges lead to more 
dropouts, it is more than a little puzzling that in our sample of twenty-
eight selective schools, none had a dropout rate for minority students 
anywhere near as high as the average attrition of 60 percent for black 
students at all NCAA Division I colleges, many of which are not 
selective. Black dropout rates are low at all of the [studied] schools 
(averaging just over 25 percent); moreover, the more selective the 
college attended, the lower the black dropout rate.57
students at thirteen elite colleges and universities). 
55. Richard H. Sander, supra note 1, at 473. 
56. Richard H. Sander, supra note 1, at 473, 479. Sander’s more specific claim is that the 
probability of a matriculating law student becoming a lawyer is determined in large part by the 
student’s entering LSAT score and his or her undergraduate GPA, relative to others at his or her 
school. Sander uses a regression analysis, based on data collected through surveys at various law 
schools about their students’ entering credentials and similar data collected by the LSAC, to argue 
that LSAT scores and UGPAs determine two things: law school grades and the likelihood of 
passing the bar. To the extent Sander argues that affirmative action programs create a mismatch 
between the LSAT scores and UGPAs of African American law students relative to white students 
at their respective institutions (which he refers to as a “cascade effect”), Sander claims that 
affirmative action results in increasing the likelihood for African American students that they will 
do poorly in law school and that they will fail the bar. Using the same data, Sander claims that in 
the absence of affirmative action (and, thus, of the cascade effect at various institutions), the class 
entering law school in 2001 would have produced 7.9% more new African American lawyers who 
entered the bar—even though it also would have resulted in decrease in the number of African 
Americans admitted to law school based on their entering credentials (LSATs and UGPAs). 
Sander thus concludes that affirmative action is the cause of racial disparities in law school and 
bar exam performance and, thus, the cause of a 7.9% reduction in black lawyers. 
57. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 24, at 258-59. Bowen and Bok wrote: 
[Within our database,] [w]e compared how black students with equivalent test scores 
performed at colleges where the average score for all students was much higher than 
their own scores and at colleges where their scores were more like the average score for 
the entire school (where the “fit” between the black student and the school was 
presumably better). The results are completely contrary to the claims made by the 
critics. The higher the average SAT score of the college in question, the higher the 
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Faced with these findings of low dropout rates at the most selective schools, it 
is untenable to attribute the alarming difference in black and white dropout 
rates to affirmative action alone. 
Sander’s study has also drawn sharp criticism by affirmative action 
scholars and empiricists for its empirical methodology, its assumptions, and the 
conclusions drawn therefrom. For example, Ian Ayres and Richard Brooks use 
Sander’s own data to argue that it presents no “compelling evidence indicating 
that the system of affirmative action . . . reduced the number of black 
lawyers.”58 David Chambers, Timothy Clydesdale, William Kidder, and 
Richard Lempert similarly critique the empirical flaws in Sander’s study, 
including “statistical errors, oversights, and implausible assumptions,” and 
argue further that the same evidence used by Sander also demonstrates that 
“without affirmative action, both the enrollment of African American law 
students . . . and the production of African American lawyers would 
significantly decline.”59 Still others, including David Wilkins, Kevin Johnson, 
and Angela Onwuachi-Willig, have critiqued Sander’s study for failing to 
acknowledge structural and systemic forms of race and gender inequality and 
discrimination that still exist within institutions of higher learning. They argue 
that these entrenched forms of discrimination, rather than affirmative action, 
are the most likely causes of racial disparities in grades and bar passage in 
American law schools. 60
graduation rate of black students within each SAT interval (including the intervals for 
students with only very modest SAT scores). . . . We also found that black students who 
did drop out were not embittered or demoralized, as some critics of race-sensitive 
admissions have alleged. On the contrary, of the relatively small number of black 
students who dropped out of the most selective schools, a surprisingly large percentage 
were “very satisfied” with their college experience . . .” 
Id. at 259; see also Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsible for the Achievement 
Gap Between Black and White Students?, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1759, 1780 (2007); Transcript of 
Briefing at 23, U.S. Civil Rights Commission (June 16, 2006) (testimony of Richard Lempert) 
(indicating that “data suggests particularly for those attending the best schools a reverse mismatch 
effect”). 
58. See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, supra note 1, at 1853 (arguing that a closer analysis 
of racial disparities in law school achievement does not show, as Sander claims, that affirmative 
action dominantly or solely creates such disparities, but instead that affirmative action mitigates 
racial disparities and “even more affirmative action would have been likely to produce more black 
lawyers”). 
59. See David L. Chambers et al., supra note 1, at 1857, 1898. 
60. See David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to 
Sander, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915, 1919 (2005) (contextualizing the need for affirmative action in 
the American history of racism, and arguing that Sander’s proposal to eliminate affirmative action, 
based on flawed analysis of data, “runs the risk of making many of the problems he identifies 
worse”); see also Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1899, 1903, 1914 
(2005) (challenging, in particular, Sander’s claims about black lawyers and the labor market and 
arguing that the poor vetting of Sander’s empirical analysis has created “unjustified doubt” in the 
minds of judges, lawyers, and the public at large, about the value of racial diversity); Johnson & 
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 4-5 (offering alternative explanations for racial disparities in 
law school performance, such as racially hostile law school environments and the taking on of 
time-consuming and psychically stressful race-based leadership responsibilities). 
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2. Explaining the Racial Performance Gap 
Notably, Bowen and Bok, as well as other scholars, do not deny the 
existence of a problematic racial performance gap in test scores.61 Unlike 
scholars such as the Thernstroms and Sander, however, Bowen and Bok 
consider the myriad of complex factors that may contribute to the existence of 
the performance gap. Those factors include inequalities in primary and 
secondary education found in impoverished and usually racially segregated 
school districts,62 racially hostile environments,63 the taking on of time-
consuming and psychically stressful “race-based leadership responsibilities,”64 
and, significantly, the empirically-tested theory of stereotype threat.65
The theory of stereotype threat proposes that racial stereotypes can cause 
black students to under-perform on certain kinds of tests, particularly when 
such stereotypes are reinforced in stressful test-taking contexts. The psychic 
burden of potentially confirming negative racial stereotypes in selected types of 
test-taking circumstances can negatively affect the test-taker’s performance. 
Controlled lab tests by psychologists Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson 
confirmed the hypothesis. When the examiners administered stressful verbal 
tests to groups of white and black students, the black students did significantly 
worse than the white students when they were told that the tests measured their 
aptitude. However, the black students did just as well as the white students 
when they were told that the test did not measure aptitude.66
In testimony before the Commission on Civil Rights on June 16, 2006, Richard Lempert, the 
Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology at the University of Michigan 
and Division Director for the Social and Economic Scientists at the National Science Foundation, 
indicated that he knew of no other empiricists “who have supported Rick Sander’s position in 
print or in [a] draft [he] kn[e]w of.” Transcript of Briefing at 21, U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
(June 16, 2006) (testimony of Richard Lempert). 
61. See, e.g., The Black-White Test Score Gap (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips eds., 1998) (collection of essays analyzing the myriad of causes of racial testing 
disparities, such as test biases, school culture, and stereotype threat, and critiquing the over-
reliance on test scores as measures of scholastic aptitude). 
62. See, e.g., Michael K. Brown et al., The Bankruptcy of Virtuous Markets: Racial 
Inequality, Poverty, and “Individual Failure”, in Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-
Blind Society 66, 68 (2003) (analyzing African American prosperity and poverty by taking into 
account “the changing patterns of racial labor market competition since the 1940s, the impact of 
government policies on racial stratification, and the cumulative advantages resulting from white 
control of the labor and housing markets.”); Michael K. Brown et al., Keeping Blacks in Their 
Place: Race, Education, and Testing, in Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind 
Society 104 (2003) (deconstructing conservative arguments about the racial education gap and 
offering a more nuanced and intersectional explanation for the gap). 
63. See, e.g., Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
64. Id. at 5. 
65. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. of Personality & Soc. Psychol. 797 (1995). 
66. Id. passim; see also Karolyn Tyson, William Darrity, Jr., & Domini R. Castellino, It’s 
Not “a Black Thing”: Understanding the Burden of Acting White and Other Dilemmas of High 
Achievement, 70 Am. Soc. Rev. 582 (2005) (discussing the way school structures create stigmas 
experienced by African American students). 
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The results of the studies discussed in the next Part of the Article suggest 
that existing rhetoric around stigma and the fit hypothesis are improper 
rationales for eliminating affirmative action. Stigma and fit hypothesis rhetoric 
characterize lower test scores and higher college dropout rates among 
minorities as harms caused solely by affirmative action. The work of such 
researchers as Bowen and Bok and others mentioned in this Part, however, 
suggests that, to the extent they exist, lower test scores and higher college 
dropout rates among minorities are consequences of structural and systemic 
forms of race and gender inequality and discrimination that still exist within 
institutions of higher learning, not affirmative action itself. Therefore, neither 
the racial stereotypes nor pressures would be eased by abolishing affirmative 
action. 
The data presented in Shape of the River, and in related scholarship on 
affirmative action and racial inequalities in higher education, force us to 
confront a deep moral and philosophical conflict, one that is at the very heart of 
the continuing controversy over affirmative action. Glenn Loury, in his 
foreword to the year 2000 paperback edition of Shape of the River, incisively 
identifies this conflict as one between the two public values of procedural 
color-blindness and substantive racial equality. He states that procedural color-
blindness “looks to how people are treated in discrete encounters, affirming as 
a value that such treatment should not be conditioned on race,” because it deals 
with “the rights of individuals . . . it is process-oriented, and a-historical.”67 On 
the other hand, substantive racial equality “looks to broad patterns of social 
disparity between racial groups, advancing as an ethical ideal that such 
differences should be reduced. . . . [It is] motivated by the status of groups[; 
thus,] it is focused on outcomes, and rooted in history.”68
Loury is not the first to have made such observations; critical race and 
feminist scholars have been making this theoretical and jurisprudential point 
about affirmative action in higher education, and, in many other contexts, for 
well over two decades.69 Leading critical race scholars such as Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams, among 
others, continue to incorporate critiques of the dominant rhetoric of color-
blindness and its debilitating impact on the struggle toward racial equality 
67. Glenn C. Loury, Foreword to William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of 
the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University 
Admissions xxii-xxiii (paperback ed. 2000). 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 
(1978) (arguing that color-blind, perpetrator-focused antidiscrimination law fails to address 
conditions and causes of material and ideological racial inequality); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
“Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (asserting that color-blind 
constitutionalism’s approach to race is oversimplified and distorted and thus can do little to 
meaningfully address American racism). 
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today.70 Like Loury, these scholars argue that in prioritizing procedural color-
blindness over substantive racial equality, anti-affirmative action opponents 
rely on an illusory assumption about the supposed “neutral” or “equalized” 
state of racial reality in the United States. As has been well documented, racial 
reality in the United States remains far from equalized. In fact, profound racial 
disparities in, for example, poverty, employment, education, and incarceration 
rates demonstrate the current state of racial inequality in our society.71 Because 
its general cause—white supremacy—is so deeply and historically ingrained in 
our political, social, economic, and cultural institutions, attempts to further 
entrench color-blindness to a reductive desire to end racial discrimination in an 
a-contextual sense are dangerous indeed. As Loury warns, 
[Such an attempt] leads inexorably to doubts about the validity of 
discussing social justice issues in the United States at all in racial 
terms. Or, more precisely, it reduces such a discussion to the narrow 
ground of assessing whether or not certain policies are color-blind. 
Whatever the anti-preference crusaders may intend, and however 
desirable in the abstract their color-blind ideal may be, their campaign 
has the effect of devaluing our collective and still unfinished efforts to 
achieve greater equality between the races.72
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to strike down public 
school de-segregation plans in Seattle and Louisville as unconstitutional,73 
Loury’s admonition is now more relevant and urgent than ever. 
70. See, e.g., Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-
Blind Society 1-2 (2003) (contending that implementation of color-blind social policies have 
resulted in “durable racial inequality”); Charles R. Lawrence III & Mari J. Matsuda, We 
Won’t Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action 67-87 (1997) (terming the anti-
affirmative action, color-blind assumption of existing racial equality “the Big Lie”); Patricia J. 
Williams, Race Talk: Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race (1st Am. ed., 
1998) (noting that racism has evolved in part because of the pervasiveness of color-blind 
jurisprudence and rhetoric); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Proactive 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 16 Nat’l Black L.J. 196, 198-202 (1998-2000) (revealing the 
hypocrisy of anti-affirmative action rhetoric on color-blindness, equality, and black “under-
achievement”); Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 985 (2007) (tracing the discourse of color-blindness developed 
in the mid-nineteenth century as a reactionary and neoconservative response to civil rights gains 
that now dominates liberal antidiscrimination jurisprudence); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in 
the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social 
Stratification, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 77, 78 (2000) (describing color-blind discourse as a “semantic 
code” that operates in many ways to “rationalize social stratification”). 
71. See Brown et al., supra note 70, at 66-103 (discussing causes of growing family 
income, poverty, and unemployment gaps as between Whites and Blacks, particularly given the 
rise of the black middle class); id. at 104-31 (discussing causes for the existence of the black-
white testing gap); id. at 132-60 (discussing causes for growing incarceration rates of black 
males). 
72. See Loury, supra note 67, at xxvi. 
73. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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C. The Legal Literature: Toward a Socio-Legal Theory of Stigma 
Much of the legal literature on stigma and affirmative action is theoretical. 
However, there have been some socio-legal empirical analyses that attempt to 
refute the argument that affirmative action harms its intended beneficiaries by 
causing stigma. First, we briefly review some of that empirical work. We then 
review some recent theories on racial stigma that help to deconstruct anti-
affirmative action stigma arguments by more accurately describing the 
phenomenon of racial stigma, and by historically contextualizing the ways in 
which stigma rhetoric has been used to oppose racial equality measures. 
1. Empirical Analyses: Krieger, Allen & Solórzano, and Hibbett 
In Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger presents and summarizes conflicting 
sociological research on whether the stigmatization of female and minority 
students results from and/or is exacerbated by affirmative action admissions 
policies.74 Following a comparative analysis of several sociological studies, 
Krieger concludes that the research, “[t]aken as a whole . . . can be used either 
to oppose or support preferential forms of affirmative action.”75 Krieger adds, 
however, that even if it were possible to demonstrate that affirmative action’s 
purported harms outweighed its benefits, it would matter little, in a practical 
sense, in the absence of policy alternatives that would ensure adequately-
integrated educational environments.76 The remainder of Civil Rights 
Perestroika focuses on the inadequacy of those alternatives against the 
backdrop of equally (if not more) inadequate color-blind antidiscrimination 
laws. Krieger ultimately concludes that, given the state of racial reality, even if 
affirmative action programs “come at a cost,” their elimination, “without an 
adequate theory of discrimination or workable equal opportunity policy to 
replace them,” would ultimately prove unwise.77
In a study of University of Michigan Law School, sociologist Walter 
Allen and education scholar Daniel Solórzano take a less equivocal view of 
affirmative action, arguing that it is necessary to combat racial educational 
inequalities and racially hostile campus environments.78 With respect to the 
stigma argument, Allen and Solórzano present evidence demonstrating that 
stigma felt by black and Latino students, to the extent it exists, is likely not the 
result of affirmative action admissions programs but of pre-existing, racially 
74. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After 
Affirmative Action, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1251 (1998). 
75. Id. at 1276. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1333. 
78. Walter R. Allen, Ph.D. & Daniel Solórzano, Ph.D., Affirmative Action, Educational 
Equality and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 237 (2001). 
ONWUACHI-WILLIG13POSTAUTHOR.DOC 9/3/2008  4:16:51 PM 
2008] STIGMA OR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 121 
 
hostile climates on the University of Michigan Law School campus itself, as 
well as four of its primary feeder undergraduate institutions (Harvard, 
University of Michigan, UC Berkeley, and Michigan State University).79 
Significantly, the data gathered and presented by Allen and Solórzano also 
show that black and Latino students are less likely to feel stigmatized in the 
presence of a critical mass of students of color, the presence of which is made 
possible by affirmative action, rather than when they are scattered and isolated 
in a given student population, which occurs in the absence of affirmative 
action.80 This conclusion is very much in line with the way that Goffman 
defines and theorizes stigma: its cause can be understood as social isolation, 
itself a consequence of a social caste system based, in large part, on race.81
A study conducted by then-Harvard law student Ashley Hibbett of several 
black law students at Harvard Law School draws similar conclusions.82 
Although her study was admittedly very small—there were only 20 
participants—and of severely limited empirical value, several of Hibbett’s 
classmates voiced cogent stigma-related concerns. For instance, one student 
stated that, with respect to affirmative action opponents’ use of the stigma 
argument, “there is a complete disconnect because on all other issues [such as 
healthcare and housing] you don’t care about me at all but on this issue you 
claim to care about my feelings and you want to use these supposed feelings to 
disenfranchise me and kick me out of school.”83 Several other students’ 
comments reflected a similar distrust of those concerned about the stigmatic 
“harms” they suffered as a result of affirmative action. Their comments focused 
on the generally alienating and oppressive nature of legal education at Harvard 
(and other law schools), which has been excoriated by Duncan Kennedy as 
“training for hierarchy.”84 With respect to affirmative action, another of 
Hibbett’s classmates incisively cut to the heart of affirmative action—not 
79. Id. With respect to research methodology, Allen and Solórzano gathered and 
interviewed focus groups comprised of African American, Latino, Native American, Asian Pacific 
American, and white undergraduate students who were attending the subject schools at the time. 
Interviews with the focus groups covered several areas, including: the types of racial 
discrimination experienced by students; students’ responses to such discrimination; the impact of 
racial incidents on students, including on their academic performance; the advantages of having a 
critical mass of minority students on campus; whether racial climate had improved or worsened 
over the years; and whether the students would recommend their respective university to other 
minority students. Id. at 243. 
80. Id. See also Supplemental Expert Report of Stephen W. Raudenbush, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (811 No. 97-75231), available at 
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/research/swrjul13.pdf (concluding, in this study of the 
likely racial composition of students in various social contexts on campus under affirmative action 
and non-affirmative action admission policies, that a non-affirmative action admissions policy 
likely would result in the absence of a critical mass of minority students). 
81. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. 
82. See Hibbett, supra note 10. 
83. Id. at 91. 
84. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique 54, 73 (David Kairys 3d ed., 1998). 
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stigma, but rather the biased nature of existing standards and definitions of 
merit—noting that affirmative action is not simply about admitting an applicant 
solely because of his or her race, but about “finding qualified people who are 
hard to find.”85
. . .[I]f you really want to find those qualified people, you have to 
change your definition of what it means to be qualified. Is it only 
grades? Is it only test scores? There have been tons of studies to show 
that different racial, cultural, economic backgrounds affect people’s 
performance on those tests, they are not made fairly, so it’s an issue of 
how are we as a society going to measure what it means to be 
qualified.86
Hibbett’s study may have little empirical weight, but its value is in its 
insightful anecdotal evidence, which makes three basic but important points 
about stigma and affirmative action (at least in the elite law school context). 
First, stigma is a consequence of institutional and societal racism. Second, 
stigma caused by racism can be exacerbated by the generally alienating law 
school environment. Third, and lastly, stigma can be eliminated by changing 
the way we think about merit, not by eliminating affirmative action programs.87
2. Theoretical Analyses and Implications: Lenhardt and Bracey 
Legal race scholars also have contributed, in more theoretical and 
jurisprudential terms, to the stigma literature. In a 2004 article, Professor R.A. 
Lenhardt identifies four components of racial stigma: (1) the dehumanizing 
imposition of, in Goffman’s terms, the “virtual identity” on the stigmatized, 
which is socially constructed, in part, from (2) the shared negative meanings, 
within both in- and outgroups, about the racially stigmatized. Lenhardt further 
explains how (3) the socialized responses of the unstigmatized to the racially 
stigmatized work to (4) reinforce the nature of racial stigma and stereotypes.88 
85. See Hibbett, supra note 10, at 96; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of 
Legacy Blacks, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1141, 1227-28 (2007) (contending that elite colleges and 
universities should take more conscious efforts to recruit Blacks who descend from slaves in the 
United States); “Roots” and Race, Harv. Mag., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 69, available at 
http://harvardmagazine.com/on-line/090443.html (quoting Harvard Professor Mary Waters as 
saying, “‘If it’s only skin color, that’s a very narrow definition of diversity. I would hate to see 
Harvard not reaching out to those African Americans who have been in the United States for 
generations. Are we not looking as hard as we should in Mississippi or Alabama for kids who 
would do well if they were recruited?’”). 
86. See Hibbett, supra note 10, at 97 (emphasis added). 
87. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why 
Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 113, 134-35 
(2005) (describing “the need for a ‘re-parameterization’ of merit standards by revealing the 
weaknesses in factors that have been traditionally used for admission”); see also Andrea 
Guerrero, Silence at Boalt Hall: The Dismantling of Affirmative Action (2002) 
(chronicling stories of Boalt Hall students, faculty, and staff in immediate wake of the passage of 
Proposition 209). 
88. See Lenhardt, supra note 33, at 816-36. 
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Lenhardt then delineates three types of resulting stigmatic harm that include: 
(1) group stigmatic harms manifested as racial disparities, discrimination, and 
microaggressions; (2) individual stigmatic harm manifested as uncertainty, 
internalization of negative and dehumanizing norms, and anxiety; and (3) racial 
citizenship harms.89 Given the real and multidimensional nature of racially 
stigmatic harm, Lenhardt argues that racial stigma, rather than intentional 
discrimination, is the more pervasive source of racial harm in the United 
States.90
As a result, Lenhardt contends that racially stigmatic harms should be 
actionable as a matter of constitutional antidiscrimination law.91 Synthesizing 
the work of critical race theorist Charles Lawrence and her own theory of 
stigmatic harm, Lenhardt develops a constitutional claim that would subject 
acts or policies imposing a significant risk of stigmatic harm to strict scrutiny.92 
She believes that her stigmatic harm claim works to bridge critical race theory 
and legal practice by shifting claim-related inquiry from the motive of the 
perpetrator, which is the focus of traditional antidiscrimination claims, to the 
multidimensional harms suffered by the stigmatized.93
Lenhardt’s theory and proposed claim of stigmatic harm have been of 
enormous help to us in our efforts to shift thinking on stigma as it relates to 
affirmative action. Her theory turns the anti-affirmative stigma argument on its 
head. When we begin to understand the complicated and socially constructed 
nature of racial stigma and its attendant harms—which are social, political, 
cultural, and institutional in nature and which exist(ed) separate and apart from 
affirmative action—we begin to see that the stigma argument made by 
affirmative action opponents is distracting and disingenuous. Those persons 
and organizations that most vehemently oppose affirmative action are the same 
persons and organizations that oppose a broad array of policies and programs 
aimed at meaningfully addressing existing racial inequalities.94 If it is racial 
89. See id. at 836-48. Group harms, according to Lenhardt, are those that are “emblematic 
or representative of the experience of a large number of a racial group’s members.” Id. at 836. 
Racial disparities, for example, in education, health care, and the criminal justice system, 
exemplify group harms. Id. at 837. Microaggressions—which might take the form of a verbal 
racial insult or simply being followed around as a person of color by a store employee while 
shopping—are more individualized, interactive, and often unconscious forms of conduct that 
contribute to group harm. Id. at 838. Individual stigmatic harm, discussed in much depth in 
Understanding the Mark, correlates roughly to the notion of internal stigma as already discussed 
in this paper. Race-based citizenship harm is related to individual stigmatic harm, and, more 
specifically, to harms that “have a negative impact on a racially stigmatized individual’s ability to 
belong—to be accepted as a full participant in the relationships, conversations, and processes that 
are so important to community life.” Id. at 844. 
90. See id. at 809. 
91. See id. at 877-78. 
92. See id. at 885-87. 
93. See id. at 887-990. 
94. See Hibbett, supra note 10, at 91; see also notes 82-83 and accompanying text. In 2003, 
for example, Ward Connerly introduced Proposition 54, yet another ballot initiative in the state of 
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stigma which concerns them, a program to fight it would extend beyond 
fighting affirmative action. 
Despite the fallaciousness of the stigma argument, it is devilishly 
successful as a political tool. At this crucial point in time, as evinced by the 
successful voter initiatives that gave rise to this Symposium, we cannot 
underestimate stigma’s rhetorical and political power among voters and 
legislators. 
Indeed, a 2006 article by Professor Christopher Bracey brilliantly captures 
the rhetorical and political dimensions of the anti-affirmative action stigma 
argument.95 Bracey argues that affirmative action opponents have been able to 
achieve their great political successes by relying heavily on the rhetoric of the 
“stigma of dependence” in combination with the rhetoric of “innocence,” 
“merit,” and “domestic tranquility.”96 He reveals that these four rhetorical 
tropes have their roots in post-Civil War opposition to Reconstruction policies, 
when they were employed by pro-slavery Congressional legislators to argue 
that the establishment of civil rights for Blacks would grant them “preference” 
and “special treatment” at the expense of “innocen[t]” Whites and the 
“domestic tranquility” of the southern states in particular.97
For example, Bracey explains how, in the debates over the establishment 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau, its Congressional opponents objected that such 
efforts to assist newly freed Blacks were “unduly paternalistic and stigmatic.”98 
President Andrew Johnson, in vetoing the bill establishing the Bureau, likewise 
argued that newly emancipated Blacks would only be stigmatized by 
dependence on the Bureau’s “largesse.”99 Bracey further points to language in 
Justice Bradley’s majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases to demonstrate 
how the tropes of stigma and innocence were employed to oppose 
Reconstruction policies: 
In striking down portions of the Act, Bradley criticized the Act on the 
ground that it afforded privileged status to newly emancipated blacks. 
California known as the “Racial Privacy Initiative.” Through a constitutional amendment, 
Proposition 54 would have prohibited the state from collecting data based on race, ethnicity, color, 
or national origin. See Smart Voter, Proposition 54, 
http://smartvoter.org/2003/10/07/ca/state/prop/54/ (last visited May 26, 2008). Such a ban would 
have made it impossible for the state to track possible racial disparities in health care and disease 
patterns, educational resources and academic achievement, hate crimes, and employment rates. 
Proposition 54 was defeated by a margin of 63.9% (voting no) to 36.1% (voting yes). Id. See also 
Lee Cokorinos, The Big Money Behind Ward Connerly, 
http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/Cokorinos_Connerly_BigMoney.pdf (disclosing the identities 
of seven of Proposition 54’s top funders and their various ties to traditional anti-civil rights 
causes). 
95. Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul de Sac of Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. Calif. L. 
Rev. 1231 (2006). 
96. See id. at 1241-93. 
97. See id. at 1237, 1241. 
98. See id. at 1279. 
99. See id. 
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According to Bradley, blacks must “cease[] to be the special favorite 
of the laws” and “take the rank of mere citizen” whose rights are 
protected “in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are 
protected.” The effect of denoting blacks as “special favorites of the 
law” was two fold. Not only did it suggest that innocent whites would 
suffer insofar as they were not denoted “special” and thus treated 
unequally, but it also suggested that there was something unseemly 
about blacks receiving special treatment, despite an historical legacy of 
oppression. In juxtaposing black “special favorite” and white “ordinary 
citizenship,” and indicating that blacks should endeavor to assume the 
rank of “mere citizen,” the Court effectively reimagines laws designed 
to promote greater equality as stigmatizing the purported 
beneficiaries.100
The arguments brought to light by Bracey in the Reconstruction context, 
of course, prefigure those made by today’s affirmative action opponents. Their 
contemporary but familiar rhetoric claims that affirmative action constitutes 
“special rights” for minorities and women and “reverse discrimination” against 
innocent white, male victims; in the context of education, the argument is that 
this “special” treatment results in disruptive “racial balkanization” and hostility 
on college and university campuses.101 Like its Reconstruction-era prototype, 
the contemporary rhetoric lacks historical context and fails to acknowledge and 
consider historically pervasive forms of racism, which are the very targets of 
affirmative action programs. 
Why does this rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of stigma, continue to 
gain political and legal traction? By considering the important and compelling 
work of Professors Bracey and Lenhardt, as well as Goffman’s theory of 
stigma, we submit that stigma rhetoric is persuasive because of how it impacts 
the ordering of our national values and political commitments. Stigma rhetoric 
works because it helps to justify, as Loury has noted, the privileging of 
procedural color-blindness over substantive racial justice, and of oversimplified 
and a-historical analyses over more complicated and contextualized analyses. 
That is, it elevates superficial and decontextualized political rhetoric over more 
substantive conversation that must occur about existing racial inequality and its 
myriad and complex causes. 
The tropes of innocence, merit, and domestic tranquility—to which stigma 
is attached—have become part of an American ideology, which is rooted in 
neo-liberal notions of individual will and individual freedoms. In order for 
stigma to attach to these tropes, it must in turn be detached from its more 
100. See id. at 1280. 
101. See, e.g., Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher 
Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students 
(1987) (criticizing same-race peer association on college campuses as racial balkanization); 
Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (1991) 
(same). 
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complicated, contextualized causes and aspects, which have been well analyzed 
by Lenhardt and Bracey, and thoroughly documented by legal and critical race 
luminaries, including Lani Guinier, Charles Lawrence, and Mari Matsuda.102 In 
addition, the rhetoric of stigma, especially as it is deployed with the trope of 
white innocence, serves to effect a type of “racial redemption,” whereby liberal 
white opponents of affirmative action can justify their resistance to affirmative 
action because their opposition is for the “good” of the minorities who would 
allegedly be harmed by affirmative action.103
As the powerful rhetoric of stigma continues to gather force, we must do 
more to interrogate and challenge the public understanding of stigma and its 
connectedness to affirmative action. By presenting some empirical data in this 
connection, we hope to contribute constructively to the important national 
conversation on race and affirmative action. 
II 
RESEARCH PLAN 
As we noted in the Introduction, the purpose of our study is to examine 
the causal connection, if any, between experiences of both internal and external 
stigma and the use of affirmative action in a school. Our survey is the first step 
in this process, collecting the opinions of a set of students at seven diverse law 
schools. This Part of the Article describes the plan of research for our project. 
Part II.A describes the method that we used to gather data for the Article, 
including how we identified the seven schools we included in our study and 
how we submitted the survey to participating students at those schools. Part 
II.B describes our ethical concerns about the study as we prepared to undertake 
it, the confirmation of some of these concerns in responses from certain invited 
schools, and our methods for addressing these concerns during the course of 
our research project where possible. 
A. Research Methodology 
To accomplish our study of both internal and external stigma, we 
102. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, 
and Institutional Change (1997) (arguing that traditional standards of merit, structural 
barriers, and institutional barriers perpetuate race, gender, and class privilege, which in turn 
perpetuate stigma related to those identity categories); Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 70 
(same); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of 
Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928 (2001) (same). 
103. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, 
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 73, 75 (1998) (defining “racial 
redemption” as a “psycho-social and ideological process through which whiteness maintains its 
fullest reputational value”). The project of racial redemption has three components: “1) 
repudiating white supremacy’s ‘old’ regime; 2) burying historical memories of racial 
subordination; and 3) transforming white supremacy into a viable contemporary regime.” Id. We 
suggest that liberal opposition to affirmative action does “transformational” work in a larger 
project of racial redemption. 
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conducted, through e-mail, an anonymous web-based survey of law students 
from the Class of 2009 (during the summer and fall of 2007) at several law 
schools. Our web-based survey expressly informed subjects of our research 
interests and asked students to focus on race-based affirmative action, which 
we defined as “the act of considering race, ethnicity, and diversity as a plus 
factor in admissions for and recruitment of underrepresented racial 
minorities.”104 The survey asked students about a range of topics, including: 
whether they believed that they were eligible for affirmative action, whether 
they supported diversity as an interest of educational institutions, whether they 
thought that they were viewed differently because of any perceptions of them 
as affirmative action beneficiaries, and what proportion of students from 
different races they believed had been admitted because of affirmative action. 
In determining which schools to include in our study, we utilized three 
different criteria. First, we focused on public law schools rather than private 
law schools because public law schools are the institutions that are actually 
vulnerable to equal protection lawsuits and state voter initiatives. In fact, the 
ten public law schools on our invitation list either had been directly affected by 
initiatives that eliminated affirmative action programs on their campuses or 
were, by virtue of their elite status, vulnerable to attack by anti-affirmative 
action proponents. We then selected law schools that were legally permitted to 
employ affirmative action policies when the Class of 2009 was admitted as well 
as those that were not permitted to use such policies at that time to allow us to 
engage in a comparative study of student perceptions regarding the relationship 
between affirmative action and stigma as influenced by their environment and 
school culture. Second, we identified law schools in the first tier because we 
suspected that discussion and intensity of feeling around affirmative action 
would increase as the schools’ selectivity increased, thereby creating fertile 
ground for the collection of data. Finally, we chose law schools where at least 
one of us had a contact, with the hope that our connections with one or more 
persons at these schools would increase the chance of having the schools agree 
to participate in our study. 
In the end, seven law schools agreed to participate in our research project. 
These seven schools included UC Berkeley, UC Davis, the University of 
Cincinnati, the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan, the University 
of Virginia, and the University of Washington. Four of these institutions—the 
University of Cincinnati, the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan, 
and the University of Virginia— considered race as one of many factors during 
the admissions process for the Class of 2009, and three—UC Berkeley, UC 
Davis, and the University of Washington—did not consider race in its process 
at the time. 
We recognize that these seven highly respected institutions are not 
104. For a copy of the survey, see infra Appendix. 
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representative of all law schools in the United States. For example, these 
schools are more elite than the average law school, and they do not cover every 
region in the country. Each school also has its own climate; some of these 
schools are perceived as more liberal environments, while others are perceived 
as more conservative environments, which may influence students when they 
are selecting their law school. That having been acknowledged, in the absence 
of any other data from students currently in law school, there is value in 
comparing the thoughts of students in these seven schools to support our 
contention that concerns over stigma are inflated. 
B. Concerns About the Project’s Impact 
We began our project with certain concerns about its potential impact on 
students, especially minority students, and with worries about our ability to 
garner participation in the study from law schools. During the course of our 
research plan, we encountered and addressed these concerns (identified below) 
as best we could to minimize the emotional and psychological impact on 
students and to ensure participation from the invited law schools. 
1. Implications for Students 
At the beginning of our project, we worried about our survey’s potential 
impact on the atmosphere at the subject law schools and on minority students 
within their hallways. In particular, we held two concerns with regard to the 
project’s implications for potential student participants. 
First, we worried that some students would perceive our survey questions 
about the use of affirmative action as confirmation of a continued practice of 
using race in admissions at non-affirmative action schools.105 Because our 
study necessitated that we ask each group the same questions, however, we had 
to decide if this concern was sufficient to force us to forego this research. 
Ultimately, we decided that such a concern was not sufficiently weighty to 
prevent our study. Although we knew that our questions had the potential of 
reinforcing the perception of continued consideration of race at non-affirmative 
action schools, we were hopeful that students at non-affirmative action 
institutions would challenge this underlying assumption in our questions as 
they saw fit—and a number of them did. For example, one student at a non-
affirmative action school asserted, “I go to [a non-affirmative action law 
school] so m[y] responses are informed by the fact that [my state’s] universities 
are prohibited from engaging in any sort of affirmative action in admissions - I 
am not sure what goes on in other states. At [my school], we need it!” 
Second, we agonized over the potential negative consequences that might 
105. For example, we asked students of color at both types of schools whether they felt 
stigmatized by affirmative action, and we asked all students at both types of schools to estimate 
how many law students of color were admitted because of affirmative action. 
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result from the proven psychological burdens of stereotype threat on minority 
students at both affirmative action and non-affirmative action law schools.106 
We specifically worried about these potential negative consequences because 
stereotype threat, unlike internal and external stigma, is “cued by the mere 
recognition that a negative group stereotype could apply to oneself in a given 
situation.”107 Thus, our survey had the potential of negatively affecting 
minority students merely because they identified as racial minorities and were 
aware of the relevant stereotype.108
In fact, the process for approval of our project before our schools’ 
Institutional Review Boards raised these questions about the potential physical 
106. Stereotype threat, discussed in Part I.B.2 of this Article, is the fear that poor 
performance will confirm negative racial stereotypes, which has been shown to undermine the 
actual performance of black students on standardized tests and in school. Steele, Stereotype 
Threat, supra note 27, at 109 (reporting that “Blacks performed a full standard deviation lower 
than whites under the stereotype threat of the test being ‘diagnostic’ of their intellectual ability”); 
id. at 117 (describing the same effects of stereotype threat on white male students—who were not 
expected to have a sense of group inferiority—when they were given a difficult math ability test 
with a comment that Asian-American students generally performed better than white students on 
the test); see also Steele, Expert, supra note 27, at 447 (noting also that “Black students 
performing a cognitive task under stereotype had elevated blood pressure”). 
107. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity 
and Performance, in Promise and Dilemma: Perspectives on Racial Diversity and Higher 
Education 92, 101 (Eugene Y. Lowe, Jr. ed. 1999) (“Ironically, their susceptibility to this threat 
derives not from internal doubts about their ability (e.g., their internalization of the stereotype) but 
from their identification with the domain and the resulting concern that they have about being 
stereotyped in it.”). Id. at 94. 
108. In fact, the great irony of stereotype threat is that it is most likely to affect the most 
high-achieving students, or those who, under normal circumstances, would be least likely to 
perform poorly and are most invested in doing well. See Steele, Expert, supra note 27, at 446 
(“Across our research, stereotype threat most impaired students who were the most identified with 
achievement, those who were also the most skilled, motivated, and confident—the academic 
vanguard of the group more than the academic rearguard.”). This finding is also consistent with 
that of Bowen and Bok, who found that most traditional-looking minority students in their study—
those most likely to be admitted under a race-blind process—performed the furthest below their 
potential. See Bok & Bowen, supra note 24, at 261; see also Hibbett, supra note 10, at 88 
(arguing that any feelings of demoralization by minority students likely stem “from long-standing 
racism and deep-seated prejudices than race-based admissions policies”). As Professor Laura 
Padilla has highlighted, unlike Whites, racial minorities are rarely judged as individuals, but are 
instead judged as a group. Her article regarding women of color and affirmative action suggests 
that qualified and successful Blacks are still perceived as the exception, a fact of which many 
high-achieving minorities are well-aware. See Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and 
Positionality: Situating Women of Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 
843, 880 (1997) (“[A]ffirmative action has made no significant difference in the way whites look 
at blacks. Competent and successful blacks are still seen as exceptional. Before and since 
affirmative action, most white people see another white as competent until proven incompetent 
and a black person as incompetent until proved competent.”) (quoting The Joint Ctr. for Pol. 
& Econ. Stud., The Inclusive University: A New Environment for Higher Education 18 
(1993)); see also Steele, Content of Our Character, supra note 14, at 133 (“The accusation 
black Americans have always lived with is that they are inferior—inferior simply because they are 
black. And this accusation has been too uniform, too ingrained in cultural imagery, too enforced 
by law, custom, and every form of power not to have left a mark.”). 
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or psychological impact of the study on the students who would receive the 
survey. In our application, we indicated our knowledge of the possible 
emotional and psychological impact of our study on those students. We 
concluded, however, that receipt of the survey or participation in the study had 
the same likely effect of regular law school events that students may encounter, 
such as heated classroom discussions on affirmative action or school-sponsored 
debates on the subject. Still, we took one additional precaution to minimize the 
psychological impact of the survey by excluding from our study first-year law 
students, a group that we perceived as being especially vulnerable to stereotype 
threat at the beginning of their law school careers. We thus chose to focus our 
inquiries on second-year law students only. 
2. Securing Participation from Law Schools 
Another concern for us was our ability to secure the participation of law 
schools in our research project. Our apprehension on this issue was particularly 
high given the potential impact of stereotype threat on minority students and 
the general sensitivity of the topic of affirmative action at many law schools, 
especially in light of the most recent wave of anti-affirmative action voter 
initiatives. Due to these worries, we were careful to assure the schools that we 
would not identify specific results as coming from any particular law school in 
this Article, but instead only discuss the survey results as part of a larger group 
of non-affirmative action or affirmative action schools. 
Still, of the ten institutions that we asked to participate in the survey, three 
declined our request. Two institutions specifically informed us that affirmative 
action was such a sensitive topic on their campuses that they were concerned 
that a survey involving the issue would inflame students further or would result 
in the effects of stereotype threat for students of color on their campus. For 
example, a person at one law school responded to our request as follows: 
While it is clearly a worthwhile project, for the reasons that I explained 
yesterday, administering this particular survey, framed as it is, would 
be problematic and potentially quite disruptive, particularly for our 
Black students. . . . Some of the questions call on students to opine not 
only on their support for affirmative action policies, but on how 
admissions policies work at their respective institutions, and whether 
certain students are undeserving. Our concern is that the administration 
of the survey would fuel a potentially toxic and misleading dialogue 
and thus inadvertently heighten the sense of “stereotype threat” under 
which students operate.109
Despite our disappointment at not securing as large a number of law schools for 
our study as we had initially hoped, we understood the reactions of the schools 
109. Anonymous E-mail to Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig, (July 10, 2007, 12:54 
CST) (on file with Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig). 
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that declined our request and were sensitive to their concerns. Indeed, the 
strong reactions of these schools, as well as the strong reactions found in some 
of the student comments on the survey, demonstrate what a difficult topic this 
issue is for law schools across the country today. At the same time, however, 
we believe that they demonstrate the importance of and need for continued and 
expanded research that directly examines the learning environment for minority 
students at law schools. 
III 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This Part of the Article reports the results of our survey. Part III.A 
describes the response rate and summarizes the students’ responses to the 
survey items. Part III.B discusses our analytical models, which test for 
differences in the responses to these survey items once other differences 
between the respondents are statistically controlled. Part III.C summarizes 
some of the comments that students included with the survey expressing their 
attitudes about the current debates that surround affirmative action policies. 
A. The Descriptive Results 
The response rates to our survey regarding attitudes toward affirmative 
action programs are shown in Table 1.110
 
Table 1:  
Response Rates 
 
Schools with 
affirmative action 
Schools without 
affirmative action 
Responses 443 167 
Approx. size of 2L classes 1066 619 
Response rate 42% 27% 
 
These response rates are low and imply that our results should be taken 
only as suggestive rather than definitive. Although the overall sample is sizable 
(N=610), there are only 32 black, 17 Latino, 40 Asian Pacific American, 31 
multiracial, and 14 “other race” respondents in our sample. Also, dividing the 
sample by school type leads to very small sample sizes of racial minorities. In 
addition, there is significant potential for biased and non-representative results 
because only schools that were sufficiently comfortable with surveying their 
110. These statistics include all responses to the survey as of December 18, 2007, at which 
point we downloaded and analyzed the data. Response rates are approximate, because we had to 
estimate the size of one of the classes based on incomplete data. We had difficulty obtaining a 
precise number for the size of some classes because of transfers, dropouts, and other factors. 
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students on the topic of affirmative action participated in the study and because 
it is possible that only respondents who felt strongly about the topic or were in 
some other way unusual responded to the survey.111 We therefore emphasize 
that, though we believe that the statistical analyses discussed in this section 
have value, the value is in (a) adding new (although non-representative) survey 
evidence to further discussions within the literature, and (b) showing the 
potential value of a broader and statistically representative study of law schools 
in the United States. 
The principal question that we wished to test was how experiences of 
stigma and attitudes toward affirmative action varied between schools that did 
and did not have active affirmative action programs. Our conclusions are 
limited to the seven schools that participated in the study and are not 
generalizable to all law schools. Still, the summary statistics for the attitude 
items as shown in Table 2 reveal several suggestive and interesting patterns 
regarding internal stigma, external stigma, perceptions of diversity in the 
classroom, and the desirability of affirmative action policies in the law school 
admissions practices of these schools. These results point to the utility of a 
broader, representative study of law schools to examine patterns like these 
across different types of law school environments. 
 
Table 2:  
Descriptive Statistics for Schools With and Without Affirmative Action 
Demographics of the sample
 
Schools 
with 
aff. 
action   
Schools 
without 
aff. 
action 
 Percent male 57% * 49% 
 Percent White 80% * 72% 
 Percent Black 6% + 2% 
 Percent Latino 2% + 5% 
 Percent Asian Pacific American 5% + 10% 
 Percent other race 1% * 5% 
 Percent multiracial 5%  5% 
 Percent first-generation college 12%  14% 
     
Only answered by students who believed their group was eligible for affirmative action:  
 
111. As one subject student noted, “I hope that when you look at the results of this survey, 
you consider the fact that students with strong opinions are much more likely to respond to it. I’m 
much too apathetic about most issues to take the time to fill out an online survey, affirmative 
action just happens to be an issue that gets me excited and angry. In fact, it’s widespread apathy 
and misunderstandings on the part of the majority of white students that gets me so angry and 
would motivate me to answer this survey and also lead me to believe that this large group might 
not be adequately reflected in the data you collect.” 
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Perceptions of stigma (5=strongly agree, 1=strongly disagree) Mean  Mean
 I do not deserve to be a student at my school 1.5  1.2 
 Classmates act as if I were admitted based only on aff. action 1.7  2.1 
 Teachers act as if I was admitted based only on aff. action 1.7  1.7 
 I feel stigmatized by affirmative action 2.2  2.2 
 Aff. action sends the message that people of color can't succeed 2.3  2.4 
     
Answered by all respondents:    
Beliefs about class composition (All=100, Most=75, Half=50, Some=25, None=0)   
 Percent Black students believed admitted because of aff. action 36 * 25 
 Percent Latino students believed admitted because of aff. action 34 * 25 
 Percent Asian students believed admitted because of aff. action 14 * 11 
 
Percent Native Am. students believed admitted because of aff. 
action 37 * 28 
     
Background and experiences (5=strongly agree, 1=strongly disagree)    
 Grew up in a racially diverse and integrated setting 2.7  2.8 
 Attended racially diverse and integrated schools 2.7  2.8 
 Before law school, I had close friends of different races 3.9 * 4.1 
 In law school, I have close friends of different races 4.0  4.0 
     
Attitudes (5=strongly agree, 1=strongly disagree)    
 Is important to learn to relate to people of different backgrounds 4.4  4.5 
 Institutions of higher ed should teach students to relate 3.7  3.8 
 Racial diversity is important; it enhances my education 3.5 * 3.9 
 Aff. action gives preferences to less qualified people: race 3.3 * 3.0 
 Aff. action gives preferences to less qualified people: gender 2.9 * 2.5 
 Affirmative action is reverse discrimination against whites 2.6 * 2.3 
 Affirmative action is reverse discrimination against men 2.4 * 2.1 
 
Due to past discrimination, law schools should make special 
efforts 3.2 * 3.5 
 Due to current discrimination, schools should make special efforts 3.4  3.5 
 The benefits of affirmative action outweigh the negatives 3.1 * 3.4 
 Racial aff. action in law schools should be abolished 2.8  2.6 
 I have never benefited from a legacy 4.4  4.5 
 I believe my racial group is eligible for affirmative action 1.8  1.8 
 I was admitted in part because of racial aff. action 1.5  1.3 
 I was admitted in part because of gender aff. action 1.5  1.4 
          
Sample size 443  167 
Difference between schools with and without affirmative action significant: + p < .10, * p < .05 
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(Pearson's chi-square test for categorical data, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for ordinal data.)  
 
Table 2 begins with sample demographics, and shows that those who 
responded to our survey at schools with affirmative action were more likely 
(p<.05) to be white and male (and marginally more likely to be black, p<.10) 
than those who responded from schools without affirmative action. These 
differences show that it will be important to control for individual 
characteristics when we statistically test the relationships that we observe in 
Table 2, in order to discover whether these differences in respondent 
characteristics explain differences in attitudes across school types. 
1. Experiences of Stigma 
When we consider the questions that were asked only of students who 
believe that their group is eligible for affirmative action (those respondents for 
whom questions about internal stigma are relevant; N=92 respondents, 
primarily black and multiracial respondents, with smaller numbers of Latino 
and Asian Pacific American respondents), we can assess the level of internal 
stigma experienced by students in both types of schools. Our most important 
finding in Table 2 is that among students of color at the four schools that do 
have affirmative action programs and the three that do not, there is no 
statistically significant difference in their responses to questions about feeling 
stigmatized.112 Students surveyed who believe their group is eligible for 
affirmative action at both types of schools report relatively low levels of 
internal stigma overall in response to questions about whether or not they feel 
they deserve to be at the school and whether or not they feel stigmatized by 
affirmative action. Thus, the “stigma of dependence” that is often described by 
those who are opposed to affirmative action is no more common in the four 
schools with affirmative action than in the three schools without affirmative 
action. The students attending both types of schools also gave statistically 
equivalent responses to the question of whether or not affirmative action “sends 
a message” that students of color cannot succeed without assistance. 
Students similarly do not report negative effects of external stigma. Most 
respondents disagree that classmates or teachers treat them differently because 
112. Conclusions here are based on the 92 respondents who answered the questions asked 
only of people who believed their group was eligible for affirmative action. Average scores on 
these items can be found in Table 2. Throughout Table 2, plus signs indicate a marginally 
significant difference in responses based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for ordinal data (p<.10, 
which means that there is a lower than 10 percent probability that the difference we observe is due 
to chance), and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level (meaning 
that there is a lower than five percent probability that the statistically significant differences we 
observe are due only to chance) between the respondents at schools with affirmative action 
programs and the respondents at schools without affirmative action programs. In other words, 
asterisks indicate that it is likely that there is a real difference between the two groups. 
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of affirmative action stigma.113 The responses to questions regarding external 
stigma also do not vary significantly between students who attend surveyed 
schools with affirmative action programs and those who attend surveyed 
schools without affirmative action programs. It is important to note that this 
result means only that students of color do not perceive negative treatment 
because of affirmative action; negative reactions from teachers or classmates 
may objectively still be occurring. Nonetheless, this finding is important 
because the arguments regarding the negative impact of stigma on students of 
color are based on the assumption that the students of color feel stigmatized or 
burdened by affirmative action.114
2. Attitudes Towards Affirmative Action Policies and Classroom Diversity 
In contrast, the question which garnered the most divergent replies from 
students at schools with and without affirmative action was: “What proportion 
of (black/Latino/Asian Pacific American/Native American) law students do you 
think were admitted because of affirmative action?” These questions did not 
specify students admitted only at their institution, but asked broadly about “law 
students.” Although students at law schools without affirmative action have 
statistically significantly (p<.05) lower estimates of the proportion of students 
of color who they thought were admitted because of affirmative action, the 
numbers are still high, considering that their schools officially do not have 
race-based affirmative action in admissions (but may have other affirmative 
action programs, such as outreach and recruitment programs). Among students 
attending schools both with and without affirmative action admissions 
programs, the modal response was that “some” black, Latino, and Native 
American students had been admitted because of affirmative action. Beliefs 
that Asian Pacific Americans benefit from affirmative action were far less 
common in both types of schools, despite the fact that several of the schools 
surveyed did include preferences for Asian Pacific Americans when 
implementing affirmative action in admissions decisions. 
When we asked students about the diversity of the schools that they 
attended before law school and the racial diversity of their current friendships, 
113. It is important to note that this conclusion, as discussed earlier, could be influenced by 
selection bias; it is possible that students who do perceive external stigma were less likely to 
respond to our survey, perhaps because of their negative experiences with affirmative action. 
However, if response bias led individuals who felt very strongly about affirmative action to 
respond to the survey, it would be surprising to find that people of color who feel strong negative 
reactions did not participate, while those with positive reactions did. 
114. For example, as we mentioned in the Introduction, Justice Thomas describes 
affirmative action in Adarand and Grutter (respectively) as resulting in internal stigma by causing 
Blacks to “develop dependencies” and external stigma by leaving all black admitted students with 
the burden of being “tarred [and perhaps treated] as undeserving.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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their reports are statistically identical across most indicators, whether or not 
they attend a surveyed law school that uses affirmative action. The exception is 
that respondents from the schools with affirmative action report having diverse 
friends before law school at a slightly lower rate than the respondents from the 
schools without affirmative action. This discrepancy suggests that it will be 
important in the analyses below to control for differences in friendship before 
law school, in order to control for the self-selection of students with more 
diverse past experiences into our surveyed schools without affirmative action. 
The “Attitudes” section of Table 2 shows that there is overwhelming 
support across the entire sample for the idea that people should learn to interact 
with others from diverse backgrounds, and this support does not vary by school 
type. There is also strong support among the respondents for the idea that 
diversity enhances education, although support for this idea is even stronger in 
schools that do not have affirmative action programs. Students at surveyed 
schools that use affirmative action are significantly more likely to agree that 
affirmative action gives preferences to less qualified applicants and constitutes 
reverse discrimination against Whites and men, which indicates that students 
from our sample who attend schools with affirmative action do tend to view 
affirmative action more negatively than students who attend schools without 
affirmative action. This survey result shows that, although students who are 
eligible for affirmative action do not report greater experiences of stigma at 
schools using affirmative action, students overall do report some more negative 
attitudes about affirmative action policies at the four schools that have 
affirmative action programs. As discussed in our analyses below, however, this 
difference across school type is explained by differences in the background of 
the respondents from the two types of schools, as well as differences in the 
political climate of the state in which the school is located. 
Students at schools that do not have affirmative action are also more likely 
to agree that law schools should make special efforts to overcome past 
discrimination and that the benefits of affirmative action outweigh the costs. 
These responses suggest that students attending schools without affirmative 
action have a more positive interpretation of the policy and are more likely to 
believe that affirmative action policies would be good for their education, 
despite attending law school in states where the rhetoric opposing affirmative 
action has been most pervasive and most politically effective. 
B. Models of Attitudes and the Implications of Our Results 
Some of these significant differences, however, may be due to the 
characteristics of the sample, rather than a substantive difference between 
students who attend the two types of schools. For example, a greater proportion 
of the respondents who completed the survey in the four schools that have 
affirmative action programs were white students and male students, and these 
differences can influence the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2. We know 
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from previous empirical research that Whites and males are more likely to 
oppose affirmative action than females and people of color, so differences in 
the composition of the samples could make it appear that the difference is due 
to the type of school that the surveyed students attend when in fact it is due to 
other factors.115 Therefore, we estimated regressions that control for some of 
the predictors of racial attitudes in order to test the impact of various 
characteristics of interest net of other factors. 
For our first dependent variable, we created a scale116 of the degree of 
stigma felt by students of color, using three items (“classmates treat me like I 
was admitted because of affirmative action,” “teachers treat me like I was 
admitted because of affirmative action,” and “I feel stigmatized by affirmative 
action”), alpha=.77.117 We also created a standardized scale of support for 
affirmative action from eleven survey items (the first eleven items under 
“Attitudes” in Table 2). This scale has a high reliability (alpha=.95), indicating 
that these items consistently measure a single underlying concept: overall 
support for affirmative action policies. Finally, we created a standardized scale 
from the two items that indicated a respondent’s belief as to whether he or she 
grew up in a diverse community and attended diverse elementary and 
secondary schools (alpha=.90), which we use as an indicator of a “diverse 
background.”118
Of course, there are also important differences between these schools 
other than whether or not they are legally permitted to use affirmative action in 
their admissions programs. Although many of these differences are difficult to 
capture, we attempted to control for ideological differences between the 
schools by including an indicator of the political attitudes of the state in which 
the school is located. This control helped to address the differences between 
schools in more politically liberal states and those in more politically 
conservative states. We gauged these differences by including a measure of the 
proportion of the state that voted Republican in the 2004 Presidential election 
(a variable which ranges from 45 to 54). This variable is a rough measure, but 
115. Howard Schuman et al., Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and 
Interpretations (rev. ed. 2007). 
116. Robert F. DeVellis, Scale Development: Theory and Applications (2d ed. 
2003). 
117.  Before the scale was made, each item in the scale was standardized so that it had a 
mean of 0 and a variance of 1. Then the items in the scale were summed. The scale of stigma 
ranges from -.75 to 2.00, with higher numbers indicating greater experiences of stigma. 
118. Before the scales were made, each item in the scale was standardized so that it had a 
mean of 0 and a variance of 1. Then the items in the scale were summed. Both scales therefore 
have a mean of zero. The scale indicating support of affirmative action ranges from -2.01 to 1.13, 
with higher numbers indicating higher levels of support for affirmative action on the 11 items. The 
scale indicating the diversity of the respondent’s background ranges from -1.22 to 1.72, with 
higher numbers indicating reports of more racially diverse experiences in neighborhoods and 
schools. Students relied on their own definitions of diverse neighborhoods and schools for these 
questions. We did not provide any definitions in the survey of what a diverse neighborhood or 
school looks like or of what it means to have a diverse group of friends. 
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provides some idea of how state climate and context might relate to the 
attitudes of law students, either because of self-selection into schools with a 
particular political climate, growing up in a nearby area, or changes in attitudes 
after arrival at the law school. The schools in our sample that have affirmative 
action admission programs are also, on average, in more politically 
conservative states than the schools in our sample that do not. 
Tables 3 and 4 include the models119 of stigma and attitudes toward 
affirmative action.120
 
119.  J. Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables (1997) (describing the process of estimating and evaluating models for categorical 
dependent variables); John Neter et al., Applied Linear Regression Models (3d ed. 1990) 
(describing the process of estimating and evaluating regressions for continuous dependent 
variables). Although hierarchical models would be ideal for hierarchical data like this (students 
who are nested within schools), we lack sufficient numbers of schools to be able to estimate these 
models, pointing again to the utility of a broader study of law schools across the country. See Tom 
Snijders & Roel Bosker, Multilevel Analysis (1999) for a discussion of sample size issues 
in multilevel data. We also estimated more parsimonious models that only include the most 
common predictors of racial attitudes (variables for attending an affirmative action school, being 
white, being male, having a diverse background, being the first generation to attend college, and 
having diverse friends in law school) because of our small sample size. These models have the 
same findings shown here regarding the effect of attending a school with affirmative action, and 
they are available on request from the authors. 
120. Coefficients in these regression tables can be interpreted as the size of the change in 
the dependent variable we would expect if the respondent had the characteristic listed rather than 
the characteristic excluded. For example, the coefficients for males represent the difference 
between males and females. 
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Table 3:  
Models of stigma, for individuals who believe their group is eligible for affirmative 
action 
 
Feels 
stigmatized 
(scale) 
Sends a message 
of dependence 
 OLS reg. Ordered logit reg. 
Attends a school with affirmative action 0.313 1.092 
 (0.308) (0.734) 
Black 0.388+ -2.294*** 
 (0.207) (0.545) 
Latino 0.066 -0.752 
 (0.243) (0.605) 
Asian Pacific American -0.405 -0.838 
 (0.298) (0.663) 
Other racial groups (excluded category)   
   
Male -0.215 0.244 
 (0.177) (0.436) 
Diverse background -0.078 0.183 
 (0.091) (0.218) 
First generation college 0.291 0.670 
 (0.192) (0.490) 
Had diverse friends before law school 0.070 -0.055 
 (0.079) (0.186) 
Has diverse close friends in law school -0.165** 0.025 
 (0.083) (0.200) 
Proportion of state voted Republican, -0.083+ -0.060 
   2004 Presidential election (0.045) (0.105) 
Constant 4.130+  
 (2.153)  
Observations 88 89 
Standard errors in parentheses   
+ p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01   
   
We use OLS regression for continuous dependent variables, and ordered logit 
regression for ordinal dependent variables. 
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Table 4: 
Models of attitudes toward affirmative action and stigma, for all respondents 
 
Support 
aff. action 
(scale) 
Percent 
Black 
believed 
aff. act. 
Percent 
Latino 
believed 
aff. act. 
 OLS reg. OLS reg. OLS reg. 
Attends a school with affirmative action 0.142 8.680*** 7.943*** 
 (0.100) (2.886) (2.713) 
White 0.014 -4.610 -5.819+ 
 (0.116) (3.366) (3.166) 
Black 0.965*** -14.253*** -11.312** 
 (0.168) (4.840) (4.553) 
Latino 0.618*** -4.598 -5.751 
 (0.208) (6.018) (5.661) 
Asian Pacific American 0.242 6.152 6.315 
 (0.157) (4.533) (4.265) 
Other racial groups (excluded category)    
    
Male -0.524*** 7.232*** 5.870*** 
 (0.059) (1.714) (1.610) 
Diverse background -0.120*** 1.933** 1.712+ 
 (0.032) (0.935) (0.879) 
First generation college -0.097 1.682 0.870 
 (0.091) (2.630) (2.474) 
Had diverse friends before law school -0.024 0.126 -0.595 
 (0.027) (0.778) (0.731) 
Has diverse close friends in law school 0.056+ -0.765 -0.393 
 (0.029) (0.839) (0.788) 
Proportion of state voted Republican, -0.052*** 0.419 0.198 
      2004 Presidential election (0.014) (0.395) (0.371) 
Constant 2.534*** 8.822 21.685 
 (0.642) (18.522) (17.406) 
Observations 598 594 595 
Standard errors in parentheses    
+ p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01    
    
We use OLS regression for these continuous dependent variables.  
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1. Experiences of Stigma 
Table 3, which includes only the students who believe their group is 
eligible for affirmative action programs, confirms the findings of Table 2: 
students of color are no more likely to report experiences of stigma in schools 
with affirmative action programs than in schools without affirmative action 
programs.121 Thus, the argument that affirmative action policies send the 
message that students of color are dependent on assistance—and that these 
students will have a negative experience in school because of those messages—
is not supported by our data. Law students feel similar (relatively low) levels of 
stigma regardless of whether or not their school has an affirmative action 
program. As one respondent attending a school without affirmative action put 
it: “[My university] apparently does not use affirmative action in its admissions 
policies, however, the stigma is still here . . . which is ironic, because I’m 
usually the only black student in my classes.” 
None of the racial groups surveyed reported feeling high levels of stigma; 
for example, the modal response for all groups to “I feel stigmatized by 
affirmative action” was “strongly disagree.” However, Table 3 does 
demonstrate small differences between different groups on the stigma scale, 
although the sample size is small for these groups. Among all surveyed 
students who believe that their group is eligible for affirmative action, Blacks 
reported somewhat higher average levels of feeling stigma than Latinos, Asian 
Pacific Americans, and other respondents (based on the marginally significant 
higher coefficient for Blacks in the regression in Table 3). The black students 
whom we surveyed were also significantly less likely than other minority 
respondents to believe that affirmative action sends an overall message of 
dependence (again, based on the significantly lower coefficient for Blacks in 
the ordered logit model in Table 3). While the data suggest that first generation 
college students surveyed were marginally more likely to feel stigma as well, 
this effect is not significant once indicators of the respondent’s race are 
included in the model because the black and Latino students surveyed were 
disproportionately likely to have been the first in their families to attend 
college.122 Those who have a diverse friendship group in law school are also 
less likely to report feelings of stigma, suggesting the powerful impact of social 
networks. Finally, those who attend law school in a more politically 
conservative state are less likely to report experiencing stigma (this relationship 
121. The coefficients for “attends a school with affirmative action” are not significantly 
different from zero in Table 3. Models (not shown) that include only the variable “attends a school 
with affirmative action” also show no significant relationship between either of these dependent 
variables and school type. 
122. See John C. Duncan, Jr., The American ‘Legal’ Dilemma: Colorblind I/Colorblind 
II—The Rules Have Changed Again: A Semantic Apothegmatic Permutation, 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y 
& L. 315, 433 (2000) (noting that low-income and first-generation students are disproportionately 
black or Latino). 
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is marginally significant; p<.10). This result suggests that, controlling for other 
individual and school factors, those who attend law schools in more politically 
conservative contexts are less likely to report negative treatment from teachers, 
other students, and general stigma. 
2. Attitudes Towards Affirmative Action Policies and Classroom Diversity 
We do find significant differences in attitudes towards affirmative action 
across school type before we include any other statistical controls (model not 
shown), as suggested by Table 2. The differences across school type observed 
in Table 2 are not significant, however, once we control for race, gender, 
experiencing a diverse background before law school, being in the first 
generation to attend college, having a diverse group of close friends before and 
during law school, and the political attitudes of the state, as we see in Table 
4.123 Table 4 includes all respondents in the sample and shows that students 
who are attending a surveyed school with affirmative action are no more likely 
than students attending a non-affirmative action surveyed school to reject 
affirmative action.124 Males, however, are significantly less likely than female 
respondents to support affirmative action, while Blacks and Latinos are 
significantly more likely than all the other racial groups to support affirmative 
action. In addition, respondents who believed they experienced a diverse 
background as a child are also less likely to support affirmative action, while 
those who report currently having a diverse set of friends are slightly more 
likely to support the policy (although this effect is marginally significant, 
p<.10).125 Finally, those who are attending law school in more politically 
conservative states are significantly less likely to support affirmative action. 
The relationship between reporting growing up in a diverse environment 
and rejecting affirmative action policies might be explained at least in part by 
the fact that some of the students who volunteered comments suggested that 
their opposition to race-based affirmative action was rooted in their personal 
knowledge of students of color from privileged backgrounds. One student, for 
example, noted: 
[M]any of the minority students that benefit from affirmative action 
123. This result suggests that the reason that these differences appear significant in Table 2 
is that the sample of respondents from schools with affirmative action contains a greater share of 
Whites, males, and students attending school in politically conservative states than the sample 
from schools without affirmative action, and all of these groups are more likely to express 
negative attitudes towards affirmative action. 
124. The coefficients for “attends a school with affirmative action” are not significantly 
different from zero in the first model. 
125. Responses related to exposure to others of different ethnic and racial backgrounds 
were self-reported, i.e., one respondent might have reported experiencing diversity, while another 
respondent might have perceived the same environment as lacking in diversity. We were 
interested in how respondents’ perception of their background related to their attitudes, but it is 
important to remember that our measure of what it meant to experience diversity as a child was 
not an objective measure. 
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come from privilege, while their poorer counter-parts never make it to 
the application process for law school. I am white, every one of my 
friends in law school is a minority of one type or other, but they all 
come from rich families (their parents are lawyers, doctors, business 
owners), while I grew up extremely poor (single mom raised 6 kids as 
a substitute teacher) and have never been able to benefit from these 
types of programs. 
Another student noted: 
It [affirmative action] should be abolished, but not without a 
replacement system which, in my opinion, should put more emphasis 
on reaching out to poor students, regardless of their race. . . . [W]hen it 
came time to apply to college, I became resentful of my black and 
[H]ispanic classmates in a way I never had been before. . . . I felt 
slighted and angry, not at my friends, but at a system which favored 
students who were less qualified than I was, but who had received the 
exact same education and gifted instruction that I had for 8 years. 
In general, those respondents who developed more diverse friend networks in 
law school, however, were slightly more likely to support affirmative action, 
although this relationship should be interpreted merely as suggestive given its 
marginal significance. This finding suggests that there might be important 
differences between experiences at a young age and experiences during higher 
education that deserve further exploration in future research. 
The regressions also reveal that the largest difference between surveyed 
students who attend a law school with affirmative action and those who attend 
law schools that do not allow affirmative action was the share of the law school 
population that the students believed were admitted as a result of affirmative 
action programs. Surveyed students who attend schools that used affirmative 
action in admissions decisions reported that they believed a significantly higher 
percentage of black and Latino students were admitted because of affirmative 
action, as the third and fourth models in Table 4 demonstrate. Male respondents 
also gave higher estimates of the share of the black and Latino student 
population they thought were admitted because of affirmative action programs, 
while black students reported lower estimates of the share of black and Latino 
students who they thought were admitted because of affirmative action. Those 
who reported growing up in a diverse school and neighborhood also reported 
slightly higher estimates. Finally, white students reported slightly lower 
estimates of the number of Latinos they thought were admitted because of 
affirmative action than the excluded racial groups reported (i.e., Native 
Americans, those who reported “some other race,” and multiracial groups). 
This effect is marginally significant, and so again should be taken as suggestive 
rather than certain, but deserves further exploration, because it suggests that the 
perceptions of Whites may differ from other minority groups regarding how 
much Latinos benefit from affirmative action. 
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C. Students’ Responses to the Complexity of Affirmative Action Policies 
Finally, when we solicited comments at the end of the survey, many 
students reported that they wished they could provide more nuanced responses 
than were possible in the web-based survey. One student wrote: 
I don’t think [the questions on the survey] will catch the more complex 
attitudes of my fellow law students towards affirmative action. Some 
of them – like myself – are strong supporters of affirmative action in 
its present form but would like to see a discourse on affirmative action 
that didn’t ring in exclusionary terms to some and that took into 
account class origin, geographical circumstance, educational history 
and the fact that many of us are multi-lingual, multi-cultural, multi-
ethnic multi-racial in ways that the old-time discourse and practice of 
affirmative action has not accounted for affirmatively and in public. 
The comments that called for a revision of affirmative action policies—many 
called for more focus on socioeconomic status—demonstrate both a more 
nuanced understanding of affirmative action than we can hope to capture in a 
web-based survey and a strong belief (among those respondents who support 
and those who oppose current affirmative action policies) that integrating class-
based remedies into affirmative action policies would be perceived as more 
“legitimate” than purely race-based remedies.126 In other words, many 
126. For example, “I am an Asian American who come [sic] from a very impoverished 
background. … My parents never made any more than $20K a year—less money than yearly law 
school tuition! Yet - because of our emphasis only on race as a factor in diversity—I am 
automatically lumped in with ALL non-Southeast Asians (all Chinese, Japanese, Koreans) whose 
backgrounds can be VERY different from mine. Yet, many Asian students in my school come 
from very affluent backgrounds and I have NOTHING in common with them. I am tired of 
affirmative action and "diversity" programs being centered only on race. A wealthy African 
American does not necessarily represent an African American from the projects of an inner city—
yet our affirmative action programs do not seem to distinguish this.” And: “Race does not 
automatically equate to disadvantage. Persons from well off families who also happen to be 
designated a member of a minority race may benefit from arbitrary racial status even though their 
race may not have disadvantaged them at any time. Poverty is a much more accurate measure of 
social disadvantage. Take for example a poor white person who lives in the inner city (perhaps in 
a predominantly black neighborhood) and has gone to substandard public schools. Is this person 
somehow better off than his or her black neighbors? If a student has had a particular experience 
with racial prejudice that has shaped their perspective then that experience can be mentioned in 
personal statements and taken into account in that way. It is not at all inappropriate for a school to 
take such an experience into account as long as they do so on an individual basis.” And: “…to 
argue that affirmative action promotes viewpoint diversity is to assume that members of different 
races categorically have different viewpoints or come from materially different backgrounds. Race 
is not the most narrowly tailored proxy for differing backgrounds and ideas. Instead, economic 
status should be used.” And: “In my experience the emphasis of AA is on race and ethnicity—a 
superficial diversity of skin color. Yet one of the common explanations of AA is to bring together 
diverse people with diverse experiences—a diversity that is more instructive and enlightening than 
merely race based diversity. This broader type of diversity comes not just from one's racial or 
ethnic background, but from their social and economic status, their nationality, political 
affiliations, the region of the world in which they were raised, and their religion. Too often society 
uses race and ethnicity as proxies for this more substantive diversity.” And: “I think law schools 
should make special efforts to recruit minority students and encourage them to apply, but I find it 
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surveyed students wrote that they supported affirmative action policies 
designed less to make-up for past discrimination and more to build a student 
body that takes into account the many kinds of diversity including, but not 
limited to, race. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we analyzed the results of a web-based survey of students 
in the Class of 2009 at seven law schools. These results revealed that there is no 
statistically significant difference in internal stigma between students of color 
at the four law schools that do have affirmative action programs and the three 
that do not have such programs. They also showed that there are no significant 
harms resulting from internal stigma at these law schools, regardless of whether 
or not they had affirmative action programs in their admissions. Lastly, these 
results revealed that there was no significant impact from external stigma on 
surveyed students at both types of law schools. 
In terms of other results, especially our findings that students at schools 
that allow affirmative action do believe that a significantly higher proportion of 
the minority student population was admitted because of affirmative action, we 
note our observation that the comments we received through the survey 
responses demonstrate how the stigma argument itself is raced and one-
sided.127 Although surveyed students of color did not report significantly worse 
treatment based on external stigma in schools with affirmative action, 
comments from a number of white students exhibited the existence of what 
could be a potential basis for external stigma resulting from affirmative action. 
A white male student, for example, declared: 
I believe that racial and gender diversity is very important, and is a 
very valuable addition to my education. However, I think affirmative 
action is the wrong approach. Affirmative action robs talented and 
intelligent members of minority groups of the credit they deserve for 
their accomplishments. As a white male student, I can’t help but 
question (at least in the back of my mind) whether a student from a 
minority group would have gotten into our program if they were not a 
member of a minority group. 
too reductive to say that just because someone is a minority, they deserve special consideration for 
admission. I feel it would be better to use other proxies for race, such as socio-economic status 
and geographic origin, then race itself.” 
127. See Bracey, supra note 25, at 39 (“Individuals who are commonly associated with 
actual beneficiaries—in this instance because of shared racial characteristics—are stigmatized 
only if one believes the actual beneficiary has been previously stigmatized.”) Bracey argues that 
the “[e]stablishment of the material preconditions of freedom is premised upon the idea of equal 
humanity and social worth,” and “[i]f providing the material preconditions to exercise freedom on 
an equal basis is not stigmatizing to actual beneficiaries, then there is little reason to think that it 
would nevertheless prove stigmatizing to members of the same social group who ultimately do not 
receive any material benefit.” Id. 
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Pundits and commentators, however, are rarely as open about 
acknowledging the stigma that should correspondingly result from benefits 
obtained merely as a result of white privilege.128 In this vein, a minority student 
asserted: 
To the extent there is a stigmatic effect to AA [affirmative action], I 
believe that it is more the fault of a misunderstanding of how AA is 
applied. Am I a fan of free rides? No. Nobody is. But I _am_ a fan of 
considering the fact that based on personal circumstance, two identical 
LSAT scores may represent two different things. And I’d rather be at 
[my elite law school] and feel stigmatized against than not be here at 
all. The best response in a drunken AA debate in a bar in [my town], 
for me, has always been to ask if the inevitably white, anti-AA 
advocate had ever benefited from being white. No white person worth 
arguing can honestly answer ‘never’ to that question. Only somewhat 
tongue in cheek, I submit that I’m all for white stigma. 
Yet, “white stigma,” as a by-product of the unfair advantages of white 
privilege, has not really surfaced in affirmative action discourse. The absence 
of such “white stigma” rhetoric can be explained by Goffman’s theory of 
stigma as a sociologically “negative” and relative phenomenon.129 Because 
stigma is both a precondition to and consequence of being a “non-normal”—
where “normal” status is defined and perpetuated by the very social and other 
privileges attached to it—“white stigma” is a fundamentally different 
phenomenon than minority stigma. In the affirmative action context, Professor 
Christopher Bracey puts it this way: “Individuals who are commonly associated 
with actual beneficiaries—in this instance because of shared racial 
characteristics—are stigmatized only if one believes the actual beneficiary has 
been previously stigmatized.”130
The raced nature of the application of the stigma argument is further 
supported by the low estimates we received in response to questions about the 
proportion of Asian Pacific American students who benefited from affirmative 
action, even though a number of the affirmative action schools in our study 
included Asian Pacific American students in their race-based programs. The 
low estimates of Asian Pacific Americans presumed to benefit from affirmative 
action and our survey results suggest that, with respect to the seven law schools 
we surveyed, it was not affirmative action that resulted in internal and/or 
external stigma, but rather racial stereotypes that have attached historically to 
different groups, regardless of affirmative action’s existence. Surveyed white 
students believed a larger share of Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans were 
admitted because of affirmative action than Asian Pacific Americans, as we 
128. See Ross, supra note 6, at 301 (“[T]he rhetoric of innocence avoids the argument that 
white people have generally benefited from the oppression of people of color, that white people 
have been advantaged by this oppression in a myriad of obvious and less obvious ways.”). 
129. See supra Part I.A. 
130. Bracey, supra note 25, at 39 (emphasis added). 
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saw in Table 2 and Table 4.131 Because Asian Pacific Americans are generally 
presumed to not be included in affirmative action programs, their surveyed 
peers tended not to “stigmatize” them as “unqualified” or “undeserving” even 
when they may actually have been affirmative action beneficiaries. In essence, 
the stigma attached to affirmative action beneficiaries did not always correlate 
with who was actually included in the preference programs, but rather with pre-
existing stigmas and stereotypes about racial groups. In other words, here, the 
stigma, not the affirmative action, came first. 
On the raced application of the stigma argument, Professor Lani Guinier 
adds another layer of complexity in her observation that legacy preferences,132 
given mostly to white students,133 do not generate the same level of “stigma” as 
race-based affirmative action.134 Here again, Guinier’s observation 
131. See Cho, supra note 1, at 1061 (asserting that the stereotype of “a uniformly 
successful, exemplary minority who do not face racial discrimination” is problematic); Harvey 
Gee, From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond: Asian Americans and Diversity in America, 9 Tex. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 129, 149-58 (2004) (discussing the model minority myth); see also William C. 
Kidder, Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action: Asian Pacific Americans Are Still Caught in 
the Crossfire, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 605 (2006) (arguing that “inattention to the distinction 
between negative action and affirmative action effectively marginalizes APAs and contributes to a 
skewed and divisive public discourse about affirmative action, one in which APAs are falsely 
portrayed as conspicuous adversaries of diversity in higher education.”); see generally Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and 
Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283 
(discussing the negative stereotypes that attach to Blacks and Latinos). 
132. Generally, legacy students are those students who receive a preference in the 
admissions process on the basis of their familial relationship to alumni of a particular college or 
university. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 85, at 1149 n.27; Daniel Golden, Family Ties: 
Preference for Alumni Children in College Admissions Draws Fire, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at 
A1. 
133. The vast majority of legacy students are white. For example, in 2002 at Texas A&M, a 
school that has since abolished its legacy admissions policy, legacy preferences allowed for the 
enrollment of 321 white students who otherwise would not have been admitted, but only three 
Blacks and twenty-five Latinos in this category. Todd Ackerman, Legislators Slam A&M Over 
Legacy Admissions, Houston Chron., Jan. 4, 2004, at A1; see also Texas A&M University, 
Office of the President, Statement on Legacy, Jan. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.tamu.edu/president/speeches/040109legacy.html (containing a speech in which the 
President Robert Gates asserted that “Texas A&M will no longer award points for legacy in the 
admissions review process”). In fact, Blacks were not allowed to gain admission to Texas A&M 
University until 1963. See Michael King, Naked City: Texas A&M’s Racial Legacy, Austin 
Chron., Jan. 16, 2004, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/ 
print?oid=oid%3A193354. Likewise, one author reported that, at the University of Virginia, 
ninety-one percent of the legacy applicants who are accepted on an early-decision basis are white, 
but only 1.6 percent of such admits are black, 0.5 percent are Latino, and 1.6 percent are Asian-
American. See Golden, supra note 132, at A1. 
134. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the 
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 186-87, 190 (2003) (describing how 
racism is linked to stigma and helps to explain “why legacy preferences, which account for a 
larger percentage of admissions at selective colleges than do racial or ethnic factors, do not 
generate the same ‘stigma’”). But see Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary 
Privilege, and the Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1375, 1418-39 (2000) (arguing that legacy preferences in public university 
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demonstrates Goffman’s theory of stigma at work. Because stigma does not 
attach in the first instance to privileged classes, here consisting of mostly white 
institutional alumni, legacy preferences do not generate the same forms of 
stigma claims (or general ire among non-legacy students) that race-based 
considerations do (among white students). Legacy admits are, to turn to 
Goffman’s phrasing, “uber-normals,” the ultimate insiders. These class 
observations are of particular interest given several of the students’ calls for 
class-based affirmative action programs that would displace race-based ones. In 
addition, they implicate the ways in which we as a society may fail to recognize 
and understand the interconnectedness of race and class privilege and 
subordination. Further discussion of this issue, however, is better left to a 
separate paper that could more adequately address the many complexities of the 
interlocking nature of class and race subordination. 
Finally, surveyed students who attended schools without affirmative 
action repeatedly expressed in their comments what they viewed as a loss in 
their education as a result of the lack of racial diversity in their classrooms. For 
example, one student at a non-affirmative action school proclaimed: 
A diverse student body in education is so important. . . . However, I 
believe in the classroom it is just as important to have a student body 
with diverse experiences, not just a mix of different races, ethnicities, 
and gender. I have learned a lot from many of my classmates . . . from 
large cities. Some of these classmates are racial minorities, and I feel 
lucky to be able to learn from them the lessons I was unable to learn 
growing up in a rural, all-White area. . . . I really wish there were more 
racial minorities in our school to make it a truly diverse experience. 
Through their experiences at schools with no affirmative action, these students 
have pointed to a meaningful deficiency in their education, both inside and 
outside the classroom. Our society must address this deprivation by preserving 
and strengthening current race-based affirmative action programs and re-
establishing those programs that, for certain students, are sorely missed at their 
institutions. Overwhelmingly, the students in our sample support the idea that it 
is “important to learn to relate to people of different backgrounds” and that 
institutions of higher education should be involved in that process.135 If we 
truly wish to live up to this goal, we must commit to diversifying these 
institutions. Since our results show that at these schools affirmative action 
policies do not in fact “harm” students of color in the way that opponents of 
affirmative action have claimed, we hope that we can move forward to a more 
productive discussion of the best way to design race-based policies to 
accomplish this goal. 
 
admissions violate the Constitution’s prohibition on titles of nobility). 
135. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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Appendix A: Affirmative Action Study Survey 
 
Stigma and Affirmative Action  
 
We invite you to participate in a research study being conducted by investigators 
from The University of Iowa and The University of Cincinnati. The purpose of the 
study is to conduct research on race-based affirmative action in higher education 
and its relationship to stigma that may be felt by individual students who identify as 
a member of underrepresented racial and ethnic minority groups or stigma that may 
be attached by majority students to individual students who identify as a member of 
underrepresented racial and ethnic minority groups. For the purposes of this survey, 
“affirmative action,” is defined as “the act of considering race, ethnicity, and 
diversity as a plus factor in admissions for and recruitment of underrepresented 
racial minorities.”  
 
We are inviting you to be in this study because you are a second year law student. 
We have distributed this invitation to you through the dean or professors at your 
law school. Your name and address were not given to the researchers. 
Approximately 2,000 people will take part in this study.  
 
If you agree to participate, we would like you to please answer the questions to the 
survey accessed through the Web link below. The survey asks you to provide 
information about yourself such as your race, sex/gender, residence at age 15, name 
of your law school, the year you were admitted to the law school, if you are a 
transfer student, and whether or not you are the first in your immediate family to 
attend college or law school. You will be asked questions about the diversity of the 
communities where you grew up, of the primary and secondary schools you 
attended, and of your close friends. You will be asked your opinions about 
affirmative action programs and your experiences with affirmative action program. 
You will be asked to click the “submit” button at the end of the survey to submit 
your answers to us. You are free to skip any questions that you prefer not to 
answer. It will take approximately 10-20 minutes to complete the survey, 
depending upon whether you choose to add qualitative comments at the end of the 
survey. We encourage you to add explanatory comments or any other information 
that you feel we should know at the end of the survey. Again, you should feel free 
to leave the space reserved for additional comments blank.  
 
We will keep the information you provide confidential; however, federal regulatory 
agencies and the University of Iowa Institutional Review Board (a committee that 
reviews and approves research studies) may inspect and copy records pertaining to 
this research. The Website where you will complete the survey is a secure Website 
and will not collect information about you. We will not collect your name or any 
identifying information about you on the survey. It will not be possible to link you 
to your responses on the survey.  
 
You will not have any costs for being in this research study. You will not be paid 
for being in this research study.  
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Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. If you do not wish to 
participate in this study, you do not have to answer any of the questions in the 
survey, and you do not have to submit this survey to us on-line. You may close 
your web browser at any time to end your participation.  
 
If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Professor 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig at angela-onwuachi@uiowa.edu or at 319-335-9043.  
If you experience a research-related injury, please contact: Professor Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig at angela-onwuachi@uiowa.edu, 319-335-9043, or University 
of Iowa College of Law, 290 Boyd Law Building, Iowa City, Ia 52242.  
 
If you have questions about the rights of research subjects, please contact the 
Human Subjects Office, 300 College of Medicine Administration Building, The 
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, (319) 335-6564, or e-mail 
irb@uiowa.edu. To offer input about your experiences as a research subject or to 
speak to someone other than the research staff, call the Human Subjects Office at 
the number above.  
 
Thank you very much for your consideration of this research study. Return of the 
survey indicates your willingness to participate in this study.  
 
1) What is your race?  Check all that apply.  
White/Caucasian   
Black/African American   
Latina/o/Hispanic   
Asian Pacific American   
Native American/American Indian  
Other (please specify)   
If you selected other, please specify: 
 
2) What is your sex/gender?  
 Male    Female   
3) What is the name of the city and the state that you lived in at age 15?  
 
4) What law school do you attend?  
 
 
5) What year did you enter the law school that you currently attend?  
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 2004    2005   2006  2007  Other (please specify) 
If you selected other, please specify: 
 
6) If you are a transfer student, please identify the institution from which you 
transferred.  
 
7) Are you the first in your immediate family to attend college?  
 Yes    No   
8) Are you the first in your immediate family to attend law school?  
 Yes    No   
 
9) For each statement, please select whichever category you deem most 
appropriate.  
 Strongly Agree  Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree  
I grew up in a diverse and 
racially integrated community 
or communities.       
I attended diverse and racially 
integrated primary and 
secondary schools.       
Before law school, I had close 
friends of different races with 
whom I regularly interacted 
(at least once a week).  
     
In law school, I have close 
friends of different races with 
whom I regularly interact (at 
least once a week).  
     
It is important for students to 
learn how to relate to people 
who are of different ethnic 
and racial backgrounds.  
     
Institutions of higher 
education should play a role in 
helping people learn how to 
relate to individuals who are 
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of different racial 
backgrounds than their own.  
Racial diversity is important 
because it enhances the 
discussion in the classroom 
and my overall education.  
     
 
 
10) For each statement, please select whichever category you deem most 
appropriate.  
 Strongly Agree  Agree Neutral Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
Affirmative action gives 
special preferences to people 
over other, more qualified 
individuals simply on the basis 
of race.  
     
Affirmative action gives 
special preferences to people 
over other, more qualified 
individuals simply on the basis 
of sex or gender.  
     
Affirmative action is reverse 
discrimination against Whites.       
Affirmative action is reverse 
discrimination against men.       
Because of past discrimination, 
law schools should make 
special efforts to recruit and 
admit qualified students of 
color.  
     
Because of existing 
discrimination, law schools 
should make special efforts to 
recruit and admit qualified 
students of color.  
     
I have never benefited in any 
way from a preference due to 
my status as a legacy (meaning 
as a descendant of another 
person who graduated from the 
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school(s) I attended) in 
admissions to college, graduate 
school, or law school.  
The benefits of affirmative 
action outweigh any negatives.      
Race-based affirmative action 
should be abolished in law 
schools.       
 
 
11) What proportion of black law students do you think were admitted because of 
affirmative action?  
 All    Most   Half  Some  None  
12) What proportion of Latina/o or Hispanic students do you think were admitted 
because of affirmative action?  
 All    Most   Half  Some  None  
13) Which proportion of Asian Pacific American students do you think were 
admitted because of affirmative action?  
 All    Most   Half  Some  None  
14) Which proportion of Native American/American Indian students do you think 
were admitted because of affirmative action?  
 All    Most   Half  Some  None  
 
 
15)  
To assist us with the remaining questions, please be certain to identify your 
race at the top of the survey.  For each statement, please select whichever 
category you deem most appropriate.
 Strongly Agree  Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree  
I think that my racial/ethnic 
group is eligible for 
affirmative action.       
I was admitted to the law 
school, in part, because of 
race-based affirmative 
action.  
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I was admitted to the law 
school, in part, because of 
gender-based affirmative 
action.  
     
 
16)  
If you selected “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” in response to the statement 
regarding whether you think that your racial/ethnic group is eligible for 
affirmative action, please respond to following statements.
 Strongly Agree  Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Not 
applicable  
I do not deserve to 
be a student at my 
school because I 
took the spot of a 
more deserving 
student.  
      
My classmates 
treat me as though 
I were admitted 
solely because of 
affirmative action.  
      
My professors 
and/or teachers 
treat me as though 
I were admitted 
solely because of 
affirmative action.  
      
I feel stigmatized 
by affirmative 
action.        
Affirmative action 
sends the message 
that people of 
color cannot 
succeed without 
special benefits.  
      
 
 
 
Submit Survey
 
 
